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INTRODUCTION

Negotiable instruments have long played a venerable role in commercial
transactions, and negotiable instruments law is an integral part of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.).' One of the identifying characteristics of a negotiable
instrument is that it must strictly comply with the formal requirements of negotiable

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; http://www.smu.edu/-jwinn,
jwinni@mail.smu.edu. The author would like to thank DwightArthur, Amy Boss, Julia Forrester, John
Gregory, Paul Turner, and Benjamin Wright for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. In 1990, U.C.C. Article 3 underwent a significant revision. See Henry J. Bailey, New 1990
Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and
Collections,29 WILLAmETL.REv. 409, 409 (1993). By 1997, the 1990 revised official text hadbeen
adopted in forty-eightjurisdictions. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. et al., RevisedArticles 3 and4 ofThe UCC:
Will New York Say Nix?, 114 BANKING L.J. 219, 219 (1997).
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instruments law to avoid being relegated to the status of an ordinary contract.2 In
1846, Chief Justice Gibson of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania wrote the
following: "[A] negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage. It is a requisite
that it be framed in the fewest possible words, and those importing the most certain
and precise contract . . . . To be within the statute, it must be free from
contingencies or conditions that would embarrass it in its course.... " During their
heyday in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, negotiable instruments were used
to mitigate a shortage of metallic currency and to support the expansion of
commercial transactions stemming from the industrial revolution.4
Digital signatures may play a role in the information revolution similar to the
played
by negotiable instruments in the industrial revolution. Digital signatures
role
bear a certain resemblance to negotiable instruments, such as a complex, formalistic
definition of the basic device, and, in some models, a similar approach to loss
allocation. This Article will describe the basic characteristics of digital signatures,
as well as the functions they serve, or may serve in the future, in facilitating
electronic commerce conducted over open, insecure computer networks such as the
Internet.5 For the purposes of this Article, a digital signature will be defined as
[a] transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a
hash function such that a person having the initial message and the signer's
public key can accurately determine (1) whether the transformation was
created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key,
and (2) whether the initial message has been altered since the
transformation was made.6
A digital signature is distinguished from the broader, more generic "electronic
signature," which is generally used to describe any form of electronic
authentication.7 Electronic signatures may include a name in the "From" header in
2. U.C.C. Article 3 provides the formal requirements for a negotiable instrument. U.C.C. § 3104(a)(1) to (3) (1995). When these formal requirements have been met, the payment obligation of the
party issuing the note or uncertified check merges with the negotiable instrument, suspending the
obligation until the instrument is paid or dishonored. U.C.C. § 3-310(b) (1995). If the instrument is a
certified check, cashier's check, or teller's check, the obligation is immediately discharged. U.C.C. § 3310(a) (1995). Once thepayment obligation has merged with the instrument, title to the instrument can
be transferred by negotiating the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (1995).
3. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846).
4. Grant Gilmore, FormalismandtheLawofNegotiablelnstruments,13 CREIGHToNL. REV. 441,
447 (1979) [hereinafter Gilmore, Formalism].
5. For a discussion of the different meanings of "open" in computing environments and the
significance ofcomputer security for electronic commerce, see Jane Winn, Open Systems, FreeMarkets
and the Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. Rv. (forthcoming 1998), available on the
Internet, (visited Mar. 10, 1998) <http://www.smu.edu-jwinn/esig.htm>.
6. INFORMATIONSECURITYCOMMrrEE, AMERICANBARASS'N, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES:
LEGAL INFRAsTRUCrURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 42,

43 (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES]. For a more complete explanation of digital
signature technology, see infra Part III.
7. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supranote 6, at 3.
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an electronic mail message, a digitized handwritten signature such as are used by
some retail electronic point of sale payment systems, or a typed electronic version
ofapaper-basedholographic signature such as "/s/Jane Winn." '8 Just as a negotiable
instrument is a type of contract that meets the formal requirements of negotiable
instruments law, a digital signature is atype of electronic authentication method that
meets the formal requirements of asymmetric cryptography deployed within a
public key infrastructure.9
Although digital signature technology has not yet been widely adopted for
business use, many proponents of this technology believe that it will soon become
a standard business practice.'" Until adequate experience with commercial
applications ofthis technology develops the "best practices" or standards for its use,
questions will abound as to what liability might arise from the use of digital
signature technology. To resolve some of the legal uncertainty associated with its
use, the American Bar Association published the Digital Signature Guidelines in
1996." This path-breaking work is the product of a project undertaken from 1992
to 1996 by the members ofthe Information Security Committee of the ABA Science

and Technology Section.'2 The Guidelines attempt to set out a coherent regulatory
framework within which digital signature technology could be implemented on a
large scale for the commercial environment. The approach taken by the Guidelines
mimics in many respects the structure of classical negotiability doctrines. 3 This
article will analyze the similarities and differences between classical doctrines of
negotiable instruments law and the role negotiable instruments played in
commercial transactions. Additionally, this article will examine the regulatory
norms suggested in the Guidelines and the role they envisage for digital signature
technology in the emerging world of global electronic commerce.
For an earlier generation of commercial lawyers, negotiability was virtually

8. Id. at43.
9. WARWvICKFORD&MICHAELS.BAUM,SECUREELECTRONICCOMMERCE 107-09,111-12(1997).
10. See, for example, the discussion of the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol being
developed by Visa International and MasterCard. Visa-ElectronicCommerce-SET (visited Feb. 19,
1998) <http:llwww.visa.com/cgi-bin/vec/ntecomm/set/main.html?2+0>. Its developers hope SETwill
become a standard for Internet and other new electronic commerce applications.
11. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 4.
12. Id. at 1. The same effort also resulted in the Utah Digital Signature Act. UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 46-3-101 to -504 (Supp. 1997). Alan Asay, one of the reporters of the Guidelines, was also the
principal architect ofthe Utah Digital Signature Act, and the two projects have many common features.
The Utah legislation differs in certain aspects from the Guidelines, such as in the specific requirements
set forth by Utah for the licensing of certification authorities. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201 to -204
(Supp. 1997). Thus, because the Guidelines are a more general, theoretical statement of the principles
animating the two projects this article will not focus on the Utah statute. For a detailed discussion of
the Utah legislation and the issues it raises, see C. Bradford Biddle, MisplacedPriorities: The Utah
DigitalSignatureAct and LiabilityAllocation in a PublicKey Infrastructure,33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1143 (1996) [hereinafter Biddle, Misplaced Priorities], and C. Bradford Biddle, Public Key
Infrastructureand "DigitalSignature"Legislation: JOPublicPolicyQuestions,(visited Mar. 3,1998)
<http:lwww.cooley.comlscripts/article.ixe?id=ar_1502> [hereinafter Biddle, PolicyQuestions].
13. See generallyJames Stevens Rogers, The Myth ofNegotiability,31 B.C.L.REv. 265,272-83
(1990) (discussing bills and notes of the classical era).
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synonymous with marketability; thus, the drafters of the Guidelines copied elements
of negotiability in the hope of improving the marketability of digital signatures.
Professor Gilmore observed that the drafters of the U.C.C. believed "that whenever
any kind of property came into the market-that is, became the subject of a large
volume of transactions either of outright sale or of transfer for security-then that
kind of property sooner or later acquired some or all of the attributes of
negotiability.
,,4 At a minimum, these attributes included free transferability,
recognition of special rights for good faith purchasers for value, and certain
procedural advantages in the enforcement of the obligation, such as a presumption
of consideration. 5 The spread of the classical doctrines of negotiability from
instruments to a wide range of commercial transactions in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries reflected a conviction on the part of lawyers and merchants that
negotiability facilitates commercial transactions by minimizing the administrative
burdens of processing information aboutproperty rights. 6 Similarly, the Guidelines
strive to facilitate twenty-first-century commercial transactions by minimizing the
administrative burdens of processing communications and protecting rights in
information in electronic commerce transactions.
Prior to the very recent explosion of interest in the Internet, for decades
electronic commerce had been conducted on a large scale over closed networks.
Since the late 1960s, billions of dollars in funds transfers have been executed over
networked computer systems such as the Federal Reserve Wire Network (Fedwire),
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), and the automated clearing
house system (ACH); billions of dollars of goods have been sold over electronic
data interchange networks. These closed, proprietary networks were built during the
era of mainframe computer systems and are now being challenged by open
networks of distributed client-server computer systems such as the Internet.
Assimilating new technologies into existing commercial practices and business
models is a daunting task. Probably for this reason, the early debate over the impact
of the Internet on business practices seemingly has been dominated by those most
familiar with Internet technology. Also, the early discussions of how digital
signature technology may be used for business applications were apparently
dominated by the technologically proficient, and surprisingly little reference was
made to existing electronic commerce applications. 7 As a result, the model of

14. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 611 (1981) [hereinafter Gilmore,
Confessions].
15. Grant Gihnore, The CommercialDoctrineofGoodFaithPurchase,63 YALEL. J. 1057,106466 (1954) [hereinafter Gilmore, GoodFaith].
16. Id. at 1070-72.
17. See, for example, the summaries of approaches to digital signature technology in FORD &
BAUM, supra note 9, Chapter 3. These authors suggest that a sale of $2 million worth of steel to a
questionable foreign manufacturer would require stronger security technology than less risky
transactions, but they do not discuss the relationship of such an electronic commerce transaction to
existing international business practices such as obtaining a letter ofcredit. FORD &BAUM, supra note
9, at 76.
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electronic commerce contained within the Digital Signature Guidelines may be of
less practical relevance than its drafters hoped.
This Article explores how, despite their similarity in aspiration, negotiable
instruments law and the Guidelines nevertheless widely diverge in their
applicability to actual business transactions. Negotiable instruments law originated
in the medieval "law merchant," and is the product of a centuries-long colloquy
between merchants, lawyers, and courts.' 8 The doctrines of negotiability served an
important role in enabling commercial transactions. 9 By contrast, digital signature
technology is a great novelty in commercial transactions. The fundamental
commercial law issue raised by the Guidelines is whether legal standards should
build from either a given technology or from business practices associated with the
use of that technology. Because there is not yet a body of commercial practices
associated with digital signature technology, ifthe correct protocol is the latter, then
no legislation is yet appropriate. However, without some form of standardization,
the lack of coordination of Internet electronic commerce systems will present an
obstacle to individual transactors, and this lack of guidance may stifle the rate of
adoption of the technology.
While the focus ofthe Guidelines may seem artificially narrow when contrasted
with existing bodies of commercial law, their focus is comprehensible within the
larger context of the possible future of electronic commerce. Shared by many of the
advocates of Internet electronic commerce is a vision of the costless and
instantaneous global auction market that the Internet could support through the
deployment of efficient security procedures.2" This global auction market could
consist of computer agents programmed to search the Internet and execute
transactions once necessary variables had been reviewed and accepted by the
computer agent on behalf of the real-world principal.
The asymmetric cryptography upon which the Guidelines are based is an
essential element to the operation of such a global Internet market. The Guidelines
were designed to be a first tentative step from existing commercial systems to this
promised land of perfect technological efficiency. This Article suggests, however,
that the Guidelines may not be well-rooted enough in contemporary electronic
commercial practices to provide a practical bridge from the present to perfect
technological efficiency.

18. SeeJAMESST~vENROGERs, THEEARLYHISTORYOFTHELAWOFBILLSANDNOTES 12(1995).
The term "law merchant" refers to the body of law followed in the courts of fairs, markets, and major
commercial cities and towns, which is distinct from the common law. Id. at 20.
19. See Robert Charles Clark,AbstractRights Versus PaperRightsUnderArticle9ofthe Uniform
CommercialCode, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 476-77 (1975). Dean Clark points out that the -"paperizing" of
legal rights that were formerly recognized only in abstract form can greatly reduce the costs of
administering legal rights; however, paperized rights can be supplanted by central recording systems
which may further reduce costs. Id. at 477.
20. See, e.g., Robert Hettinga, e$: The Wealth ofNation-states,(last modified June 13, 1996)
<http://www.shipwright.comfrants/rant__13.html> (predicting that strong cryptography will aid in the
development of instantaneous settlement of trades for cash).
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WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, AND WHAT BUSINESS
OBJECTIVES DO THEY SERVE?

While it is now commonplace to question the .relevance of negotiable
instruments law,2' it is useful to discuss briefly the circumstances which gave rise
to the doctrines of negotiability and the business functions that these doctrines
served in their historical context.
A. Early Origins
Before considering the origins of negotiable instruments, pausing to define the
term "negotiable" is worthwhile in the context of this discussion. Because one focus
of this Article is the general concept of negotiability and the idea of negotiable
instruments as they evolved over time, the definition of a negotiable instrument
provided by the most recent version of U.C.C. Article 322 is not the most
appropriate. Professor Gilmore suggests that the principal attributes of a negotiable
instrument are as follows:
(1) The paper must be freely aisignable; no restraints on
alienation will be tolerated.
(2) The debt claim is "merged". into the paper evidencing the
claim; thus the paper must be treated in many situations as if
it were the claim itself:
(3) In pursuing his claim against the obligor, the holder receives
the benefit of a series of presumptions which cast on the
defendant the greater part of the burden of proof normally

21. The first academic to address this issue seems to have been Professor Rosenthal. Albert J.
Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1971). Following his lead were
Professors Gilmore, Rogers, and Mann. See Gilmore, Formalism,supranote 4; Gilmore, Confessions,
supra note 14; James Steven Rogers, The IrrelevanceofNegotiableInstruments Conceptsin the Law
of the Check-Based PaymentSystem, 65 TEx. L. REV. 929 (1987); Ronald J. Mann, Searchingfor
Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951 (1997).
22. U.C.C. Article 3 defines negotiable instrument as
an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or
without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes
into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment
ofmoney, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or
power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an
authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on
or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law
intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
U.C.C. § 3-104 (1995).
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carried by plaintiffs in contract actions.
(4) On default by the obligor, the holder has an automatic right
of recourse against prior indorsers.
(5) [The purchase is a] "purchase in good faith, without notice
and for value":
(6) Any holder, even though he took the instrument in bad faith,
with notice of defenses, after maturity and without giving
value, has all the rights of any prior holder in due course from
whom his title derives (provided only that he himself is not a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument).
(7) A holder in due course, or a holder whose title is derived
from such a holder, holds the instrument free both of equities
of prior owners of the instrument, and of defenses of the
obligor except the so-called "real" defenses.'
While the doctrines of negotiability have evolved over time, many legal
professionals often fail to recognize the degree to which these doctrines have
changed and developed in respons6 to changing commercial circumstances.24 It is
therefore necessary to review in summary fashion the historical origins of
negotiability, its great significance in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
commercial practice, and its more recent decline in importance.
The traditional account of the development of negotiable instruments law
begins in the Middle Ages with the development of the Lex Mercatoria, or law
merchant.' The law merchant originated from the need to articulate customs and
norms governing trading activities as merchants transacted in fairs located in many
diverse regions of Europe in the Middle Ages.26 The law merchant consisted of
legal customs that developed through this trading activity. These customs were
applied to resolve disputes that arose between merchants at trade fairs. Merchant
customs were not considered part of the law of the territorial sovereign where the
dispute arose or was adjudicated, but rather reflected the norms of the nomadic
merchant community.' In England, the relationship between the law merchant and
the common law was clarified in 1353 by the Statute of Staples.28 This created
separate courts for the adjudication of commercial disputes with a special focus on
disputes arising out of the trade of staple commodities, which the king wished to
promote."' Some of the earliest surviving records of negotiable instruments are

23. Gilmore, GoodFaith,supranote 15, at 1064-66 (citations omitted).
24. See Rogers, supra note 13, at 267.

25. See generally ROGERS, supranote 18, at 20; 8 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW, 113-14 (1926).
26. Id. at 21.
27.Id. at 21-22.

28. Statutes of Staples, 1353, 27 Edw. I.
29. Id.
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found in the records of the staple courts.3"
Part of the conventional history of the development of negotiable instruments
law has been the hostility ofthe common-law courts to the enforcement of merchant
custom and to the legitimate business interests of merchants. Because of this
conflict between merchant customs, such as negotiability and the general law
governing obligations, that common-law courts applied through the writ system, the
merchant community avoided using the courts of territorial sovereigns to resolve
its disputes. This wholesale avoidance of the common-law courts by merchants was
believed to have lasted until the incorporation of the law merchant into the common
law through the work of eighteenth-century jurists such as Lord Mansfield.3 ' The
incorporation of the law merchant to ok place in large part through Lord Mansfield's
practice of impaneling special juries composed of merchants to advise him on the
nature ofmerchant custom, which then became part of the common law through the
holdings of his reported decisions.3 2
This account of how the common law incorporated the law merchant highlights
the novelty of commercial law doctrines and their marked departure from commonlaw norms. One classic example of this divergence is the difference between the
general common-law principle of derivative title and the commercial doctrine of
bona fide purchase.33 Under derivative title, the transferee receives no greater rights
than the transferor had to give. Under bona fide purchase, a transferee who takes in
good faith and without notice of infirmities in the transferor's title may take free of
those infirmities, effectively granting the transferee better title than that possessed
by the transferor. This divergence between common-law and law merchant norms
is thought to reflect the development of a clear body of legal rules within the law
merchant.3" The law merchant, prior to its incorporation, presumably included
certain highly formalistic rules such as those governing negotiability or bona fide
purchases because such formal rules were thought essential to support the rise of
commerce.3" In the case of negotiable instruments law, the development of bills and
notes as a form of circulating currency in the era prior to regulated private banking
institutions depended on the application of doctrines such as the holder in due
course rule to certain contracts evidencing an obligation to pay money.3 a
However, recent scholarship has cast grave doubts on this conventional
wisdom. It now seems unlikely that the origins of modem commercial law originate
either in the hostility ofthe common law to the law merchant or in the incorporation

30. See ROGERS, supranote 18, at 22.
31.Id. at24.
32. Edward L. Rubin, LearningfromLordMansfield: Towarda TransferabilityLawforModern
CommercialPractice,31 IDAHO L. REV. 775, 780-82 (1995).
33. The negotiable instruments doctrine of holder in due course is only one example of the bona
fide purchase doctrine found throughout many areas of commercial law. See Gilmore, Confessions,
supra note 14, at 607.
34. Rogers,supranote 13, at270 n.6 (citing J.M. OGDEN, THELAW OFNEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
9-10 (1909)).
35. See Rogers, supra note 13, at 270.
36. Id.
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of the law merchant into the common law through the work of path-breaking jurists
such as Lord Mansfield.37 Commercial law cases were litigated in the king's courts
throughout the period when merchants were thought to be unwilling to submit to the
jurisdiction of territorial sovereigns. 8 The records of proceedings in the king's
courts obscured the impression of infrequent commercial litigation by focusing
almost exclusively on aspects of the writ system that are now thought of as
procedural matters to the exclusion of the substantive elements of the cases.3 9 As a
result of this focus, it is often difficult to determine what was the substantive law
at issue in all types of early cases, making commercial disputes indistinguishable
from other disputes in the remaining written records. The written records that
specified commercial cases which survive indicate the commercial matters were
litigated as part of the general law governing obligations, without any indication
that the parties sought the recognition of distinctive mercantile customs that
diverged from the common law reflected in the writ system, and without any
indication that similar cases brought in mercantile courts proceeded any
differently.' The notion that commercial law developed apart from and in
opposition to the common law seems to have originated much later, and to have
been developed to legitimate innovations in commercial law and practice through
the invocation of romantic, mythic notions of a formerly autonomous body of
commercial custom.41
B. ClassicalNegotiability

The basic outlines of negotiable instruments law were clear in the common law
by the eighteenth century.4 2 The law of bills provided for transferability free from
certain defenses that might be raised in common law actions, as well as certain
procedural conventions that permitted their enforcement more rapidly than general
contractual obligations.43 In the prototypical transaction, a bill was created when a
creditor instructed his or her debtor to pay over some part of the amount owed the
creditor to a third party by issuing a draft." Bills were issued for a variety of

37. See, e.g., ROBERT BRAUCHER & ROBERT A. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 151 (1977) (noting that Mansfield handed down rules "that had been merchants' law

for centuries").
38. ROGERS, supranote 18, at 27.
39. See id. at 19.

40. See id. at 54.
41. Id. at 150,220. The process of inventing a mythic legal past in order to justify contemporary
innovation without acknowledging it as such is described in J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTrrUTIONANDTHEFEuDALILAW 261-64 (2d ed. 1987). Pocock discusses theroleplayed inEnglish
political history by the anachronistic notion of an "ancient constitution," including the idea that the king
as well as the people are subject to the law of the land, in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Id. at 23132.
42. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 1-2.
43. Id. at 125-27.
44. Id. at 33-34.
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4
purposes, including to settle debts and to evidence an extension of credit.
In the early eighteenth century, merchants attempted to expand the application
of negotiability doctrines from drafts to promissory notes. In two celebrated
opinions, ChiefJustice Holt declined to recognize this innovation.'"These opinions
were overruled by Parliament in the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, which provided that
promissory notes were negotiable in the same manner as bills.47 Justice Holt's
reasoning is a significant source of the myth of an autonomous law merchant and
the hostility of common law institutions to him, although this is inaccurate as a
reading of the case and as a surmise regarding the larger questions of legal history.48
The Statute of Anne was the law at issue in Overton v. Tyler.49 In that case, two
creditors were claiming priority in the distribution of the proceeds ofa sheriff s sale
of the debtor's goods, and the dispute was resolved by comparing the dates on
which their respective judgments against the debtor were delivered to the sheriff.
However, the second-in-time creditor objected that the first-in-time creditor's
judgment was invalid because it was a judgment on a promissory note, and the
debtor had not received the three-day grace period following presentment and
dishonor as required under the Statute of Anne. Chief Justice Gibson ruled against
the second-in-time creditor because the promissory note contained additional terms
not authorized by the Statute of Anne; therefore, it was not a "courier without

luggage." Thus, none of the provisions of the Statute of Anne, including the grace
period, applied."0
Overton v. Tyler was handed down in 1846, toward the end of what Professor
Rogers labels the "classical" era ofnegotiability, a period from the early eighteenth
to the early nineteenth centuries. 5' During this era, negotiable bills and notes played
a vital role in providing the necessary liquidity to finance the expansion of
commerce and the inception of the industrial revolution. The amount of metallic
currency in circulation was inadequate to meet the needs oftransacting parties, and
the pillar of the modem American payment system, the check, had not yet been
developed. 2 The volume ofnegotiable bills and notes in circulation expanded to fill
the vacuum, providing a sufficiently convenient and reliable alternative to specie
to meet the demands of the rapidly expanding English and American economies.5 3
This expansion of the role of negotiable instruments was hardly
uncontroversial. Professor Horwitz points out that the majority of American
colonies did not recognize the negotiability of notes, the Statute of Anne

45. See id. at 32-40.
46. Id. at 177. The cases were Clerke v. Martin, 92 Eng. Rep. 6 (1702), and Buller v. Crips, 87
Eng. Rep. 793 (1703).
47. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 184.
48. Id. at 186.
49. 3 Pa. 346 (1846).
50. Id. at 348.
51. Rogers, supra note 13, at 267.
52. Gilmore, Formalism,supranote 4, at 447.
53. Id. at 447-48.
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notwithstanding. 4 In the colonies and in the early years of the republic, courts
struggled to reconcile their concern with the plight of the maker of a note, who lost
the right to raise legitimate defenses such as fraud if the note was negotiable and
payment was sought by a holder in due course, with the economic need for a
circulating currency composed of negotiable instrtments.55 The lack of uniformity
in the enforcement of the doctrines of negotiability in state courts led holders of
instruments to seek enforcement in federal courts. The Supreme Court endorsed this
strategy in Swift v. Tyson,56 when it found that federal courts could apply federal

common law in commercial cases because commercial law doctrines were common
to all57jurisdictions and there was a need for uniformity in the application of the
law.

However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, demand for a circulating
currency composed of bills and notes was already diminishing.5" By the beginning
of the twentieth century, currency reforms and modem uses of bank credit such as
checking accounts had rendered the use of mercantile bills of exchange as currency
obsolete. 9 Yet the doctrines of negotiability did not wither and die when the
original business necessity that supported their development faded. Instead, the
doctrines of negotiability redoubled in importance as they were applied to a wide
range of new transactions. These transactions included conditional sales, or
0
promissory notes
issued by borrowers to•banks that
61 were not intended to circulate,
investent
investment securities such as share certificates, municipal bonds, 62 documents of

54. MORTON J. HoRTwrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at214 (1977).
55. Id. at 218.
56.41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruledby Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,79 (1938).
57. In writing for the Court, Justice Story stated that Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
upon its true intendment and construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and
local usages of the character before stated, and does not extend to contracts and
other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect
whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the
general principles and doctrines ofcommercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the
decisions ofthe local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, andwill receive,

the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish
positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be
bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly

declared in the languages of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde,
2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only,
but of the commercial world.
41 U.S. at 19. Justice Story was the author of two leading commercial law treatises of the day. See
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, FOREIGN AND INLAND, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1843); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF

PROMISSORY NOTES, AND GUARANTIES OF NOTES, AND CHECKS ON BANKS AND BANKERS (1845).

58. Gilmore, Formalism,supra note 4, at 452.
59.Id.
60. See Gilmore, Good Faith,supra note 15, at 1093.
61.d at 1075.
62. d. at 1090-91.
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title,63 chattel paper, 64 and mortgage notes.65 This rapid and multifaceted expansion
of the doctrine of negotiability into various types of commercial transactions was
accomplished because commercial lawyers believed that by doing so, the value of
property exchanged in such transactions could be increased by removing obstacles
to the free transferability of that property.66
This triumph of the doctrine of negotiability across so many categories of
commercial transactions can be seen as part of a process described by Dean Clark
as "paperizing" rights.67 Dean Clark suggests that the progress of commercial law
can be thought of as a movement away from primitive systems in which the
entitlements of the parties are mere abstract ideas reflected only in the memories of
the parties. In such a system, the costs of enforcing transfers of entitlements from
one party to another are high, as is the risk of fraud and error.6" A subsequent
advance from a system of purely abstract entitlements is a system of possession in
which entitlements are demonstrated through physical control of assets. While
simpler to administer than the abstract entitlement system, a possessory system is
severely limited in the types of entitlements it can administer.69 When rights to
tangible and intangible property are written down on paper, then many of the
problems of the abstract and possessory models are eliminated. If a further step is
taken, the paper that describes the entitlement can be treated as the embodiment of
the abstract right it represents, and transfers of possession of the paper can be used
to effect transfers of the underlying entitlement.7" The rapid expansion of the
doctrine of negotiability, which is a system for administering papers that embody
abstract rights, seems to be driven by the desire of parties to commercial
transactions to achieve the type of transactional efficiencies that Dean Clark
suggests result from paperizing abstract rights.
C. Modern Decline in Significance
Simply paperizing rights does not represent the most efficient method of
transferring entitlements to commercial property. Central recording or filing
systems can be combined with paperized rights to permit the paper embodiment of
the right. Also, notice of transfers of the paper embodiment can be kept in a central
system to which potential transferees may refer.7 Examples of registry systems
combined with paperized rights include real property records offices and U.C.C.
filing offices maintained by each state or local jurisdiction. Also, the centralized
securities clearance system maintained by the Depository Trust Company and the

63. Id. at 1077.
64. Id. at 108 1.
65. Id. at 1082.
66. See Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 14, at 611.
67. Clark, supranote 19, at 476.
68. Id. at 473-74.
69. Id. at 475-76.
70. Id. at 476-77.
71. Id. at 478.
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National Securities Clearing Corporation is a registry system combined with
paperized rights because thebasis for all registry entries reflecting transfers ofrights
are "jumbo" certificates representing millions of shares retained by the Depository
Trust Company in its vaults.72
A further step beyond registries combined with paperized rights are modem
systems designed to take full advantage of the efficiencies information technology
can offer. Such systems include uncertificated securities such as mutual fund shares,
U.S. Treasury obligations, and secondary mortgage obligations such as passthrough certificates offered by the Government National Mortgage Association and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 3 In addition, many modem

electronic payment systems that support automated teller machines might be
considered electronic registries that do not rely on paperized rights in their
operation. The European Commission has provided support to BOLERO, a central
electronic registry service for international trade documents that is expected to
become operational in 1998. 74

D. Negotiability as a Loss Allocation System
Under modem conditions of falling communications and information
processing costs, registry systems can provide greater certainty to transferees of
rights at a lower cost than systems based on paperized rights. However, the decline
in significance of the doctrines of negotiability is not only a reflection of the

emergence of new information technologies that reduce the costs of maintaining
private centralized registry-like systems to administer transfers of entitlements. The
attempt by unscrupulous merchants to cut off valid defenses against themselves or
their associates through the application of doctrines of negotiability to consumers
was resisted first by courts75 and then by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
which passed a blanket prohibiti6n on the application of holder in due course
doctrines in commercial transactions.76 In transactions between two parties in

business, it may be reasonable to expect that the transactors understand the
fundamentals of negotiability and are prepared to accept the risks associated with
it, such as the possibility of being haled into court by an adversary armed with
extraordinary procedural advantages. It seemed obvious to most observers at the

72. U.C.C. Revised Article 8, Prefatory Note I(D) (1995).

73. Id. I(C).
74. Andrew Reinbach, Bringing Trade Documentation into the 20th Century, BANK SYSTEMS
+TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 1997, at 23, 23.

75. Gilmore, GoodFaith,supra note 15, at 1093-1102.
76. Holder in Due Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1997). The FTC holder in due course
regulations were first enacted in 1971. See JAMES J. WrTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 530 (4th ed. 1995). However, in certain consumer transactions abuses still exist
where negotiable instruments are used to finance fraudulent home improvement schemes. See Julia
Patterson Forrester, Constructinga New TheoreticalFrameworkforHome Improvement Financing,
75 OR. L. REv. 1095, 1111 (1996).
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time, however, that this was too high a standard to expect from consumers. 77
The FTC rule was designed to transfer the costs of fraud and malfeasance on
the part of merchants to creditors who are better equipped than consumers to absorb
losses on individual transactions or to seek compensation from the corrupt
merchant. 78 This recasts a problem in the development of legal doctrine as a
problem in managing social costs or in allocating losses. 79 A system for managing
the transaction costs associated with transfers of entitlements can include loss
spreading, loss reduction and loss imposition principles.8 ° Viewing the traditional
doctrines of negotiability in this light, it becomes clear that negotiability offers the
parties a decentralized, individualistic loss-reduction, and loss-imposition system.
This is in marked contrast with some more modem commercial transaction systems,
such as the credit card system, which primarily relies more on centralized loss
reduction and loss spreading policies.8
Some of the risks associated with commercial transactions include the
following: the vendor may not have good title to the asset being transferred; the
purchaser may not be able to pay the agreed amount or the payment, once received,
will later be revoked; and the vendor may falsely represent the subject matter of the
transaction. A centralized system for pooling the risks of commercial transactions
under negotiability doctrines is difficult to establish for several reasons. The
traditional model of a commercial transaction tacitly assumed by negotiable
instruments law involves isolated dealings between natural persons who may be
strangers and for whom litigation is the ultimate enforcement mechanism for
shifting losses once they occur. With regard to the classical era of negotiability in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of establishing a large, centrally
administered risk pool for commercial transactions is anachronistic. Until very
recently, the overhead of setting up a centralized risk spreading system was
prohibitive if the normal transactions were isolated, discrete transactions between
strangers.
Parties to negotiable instruments transactions are thus pushed to manage risks
on an individual basis and to self-insure. Risk management is easier to accomplish
for a party who engages in enough transactions to create its own risk pool whose
net worth is large in relation to the amount at issue. 82 Likewise, risk management

77. White and Summers, after voicing their objections to the procedure used by the FTC to
effectively abolish the holder in due course doctrine in consumer transactions, state: "While we do
not share the belief of FTC zealots that it was the most awful thing in Western jurisprudence, we
believe that on balance the world is better off with abolition of the holder in due course doctrine in
consumer transactions." WanTE & SUMMERS, supra note 76, at 531.
78. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,523 (1975);
Forrester, supra note 76, at 1107-08.
79. The modem law and economics literature that recasts doctrinal issues as economic efficiency
questions began with R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
80. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory ofLossAllocationforConsumerPayments,
66 Tax. L. REV. 63, 70 (1987).
81. See id. at97.
82. See id. at 71.
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is more difficult for those parties who engage in few transactions or whose net
worth is small in relation to the amount at issue. A collective insurance system for
risks associated with negotiable instrument transactions is not impossible. Many
retail merchants who accept checks from the public now have alternatives to selfinsurance. For a small charge on each transaction, they can purchase indemnity
from a commercial check guaranty service that assumes the costs of collecting
dishonored checks. However, these indemnity services are not available to
consumers that accept negotiable instruments as payment.
Although loss spreading is generally incompatible with the structure of
traditional negotiability doctrines, negotiability permits loss imposition and loss
reduction to take place. Loss imposition is accomplished not only through the
special procedural privileges enjoyed by a holder in due course. Specifically,
transfer warranties protect the final purchaser of an instrument from losses that
might arise from defects in title without regard to whether the purchaser qualifies
as a holder in due course.83
Loss reduction strategies can be implemented by any party who, under the loss
imposition provisions of negotiable instruments law, would be stuck with the cost
of fraud, error, or failure of one of the parties to the transaction to fulfil its
performance obligations. The maker or drawer of a negotiable instrument needs to
recognize that in return for the lower cost of financing a transaction which results
from the choice of documenting the obligation to pay as a negotiable instrument,
the maker or drawer is assuming a greater risk of losing the right to assert otherwise
valid contract defenses. The classic fact patterns used to teach negotiability
doctrines involve disputes between two "innocents"--neither party is directly
responsible for the fraud, error, or default-giving rise to the loss-yet, the true
malfeasor or incompetent is judgment proof or is beyond the court's jurisdiction.
Negotiability provides a mechanism for assigning the loss to one of the two
innocent parties.
The loss imposition rules of negotiable instruments law can produce outcomes
that seem unduly harsh in some contexts such as when holder in due course
doctrines are applied to consumers. The apparent harshness of these rules is
comprehensible in light of the historical circumstances under which negotiability
developed, before modem risk pooling schemes were commonplace. If these
outcomes are in fact fair, it is because of the willingness of commercial parties to
accept a system with clearly defined, well-known rules and to implement loss
reduction strategies accordingly."

83. U.C.C. § 3-416 (1995). Transfer warranties in the current version of U.C.C. Article 3 apply
to any "transferee" and include warranties that the transferor is "entitled to enforce the instrument,"
that all signatures on the instrument are genuine, that "the instrument has not been altered," that there
are no defenses which can be asserted against the transferor, and that the transferor has no knowledge
of the insolvency of the maker or drawer. Id. § 3-416(a)(l)-(5).
84. In keeping with the tradition of clear rules, older restatements of negotiable instrument law
allocated the entire loss for fraud and error to only one of the parties. One of the innovations in the
1990 revisions of Article 3 was a movement away from a contributory negligence standard in the
provisions governing allocation of certain fraud and forgery losses toward a comparative fault
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In the classical era of negotiability, familiarity with negotiability rules could be
considered a form of human or social capital which transactors might try to use to
their competitive advantage."5 To the extent that the parties to a transaction know
and understand negotiable instruments law, they can reduce the direct costs of
executing the transaction by taking advantage of the formal standards of
negotiability to structure and document the transaction. Negotiability was applied
to a wide range of commercial transactions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in part to achieve the transactional efficiencies that result from the
application of a well-defined, widely used set of rules.86
While it may be reasonable to apply doctrines of negotiability to commercial
parties, it is less certain that the same conclusion should prevail in transactions in
which one party is a consumer. Consumers are at a disadvantage in many
commercial transactions because the costs of trying to negotiate a deal that varies
from the standard form contract are disproportionately high for the consumer. In
addition, the costs of achieving an equivalent mastery of the information needed to
make a rational decision in each transaction disfavors the consumer. 7 As repeat
players in many of their commercial transactions, commercial parties can afford to
invest in structuring transaction forms and developing loss-reduction expertise for
routine types oftransactions. However, consumers are often infrequent participants
in many markets; thus, an equivalent investment by a consumer would dwarf the
value of any individual transaction and would be difficult to justify on efficiency
grounds. Because consumers cannot be expected to develop an adequate familiarity
with the doctrines ofnegotiability, they cannot appreciate the amount and nature of
loss-avoiding procedures that should be adopted to lower the risk of being forced
to accept a loss for fraud, error, or other problem such as insolvency by another
transactor.
The significance of negotiability may be declining in many nonconsumer
commercial transactions. Professor Mann has studied contemporary commercial
practices and discovered that the focus of traditional negotiability on merging
abstract rights with pieces of paper now imposes substantial costs on businesses.88

standard that permits a court to divide the loss between the parties based on their relative fault. See
U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 4 (1995).
85. Investments in human capital are "activities that influence future monetary and psychic
income by increasing the resources in people .... The many forms of such investments include
schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, migration, and searching for information about prices
and incomes." GARY S.BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL 11 (3d ed. 1993). Social capital has been defined
as a resource that "facilitates production, but is not consumed or otherwise used up in production"...
and is derived from "ordinarily informal relationships, established fornoneconomic purposes, yet with
economic consequences." James S.Coleman,A RationalChoicePerspectiveonEconomicSociology,
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 166, 175 (Niel J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds.,
1994).

86. See, e.g., Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 14, at 611-12 (discussing the explosion of
accounts-receivable financing and its incorporation into the first uniform receiveables financing
statute).
87. Cooter &Rubin, supra note 80, at 68-69.

88. Mann, supranote 21, at 956.
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Transactions that are structured to take advantage of modem information
technologies and to avoid paperized rights systems like negotiability may be less
costly for transactors. 9 Professor Mann's empirical studies mirror the work of
earlier jurists who noted the same decline by analyzing the development of legal
doctrine. Furthermore, the studies point toward the conclusion that the real
economic significance of negotiability has probably been in decline for decades. For
example, the check collection system processes papers that are negotiable
instruments, yet such a system operates largely without reference to the doctrines
of negotiability. 90
This is not to say that significant exceptions to the general trend do not exist.
Issuing commercial paper is a common method of raising working capital for
businesses, and it "is generally issued in bearer form and is fully negotiable."91
Mortgage notes that are eligible for sale to secondary market institutions such as the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation must also be fully negotiable.' Under
certain circumstances, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation enjoys a form of
holder in due course status when it acts as receiver to collect on loans in the
portfolio of failed financial institutions.93
Inboth commercial and consumer contexts, electronic commerce is supplanting
paper-based commercial practices. Large proprietary networks have revolutionized
many commercial practices. The rise in importance of wire transfer systems such
as Fedwire, maintained by the Federal Reserve Banks, or CHIPS, the wire transfer
system maintained by the New York Clearing House Interbank Payment System,
led to the creation of U.C.C. Article 4A which governs wholesale funds transfers.94
The rise of automated clearinghouse funds transfer systems and other electronic
funds transfer (EFT) systems that support the retail consumer network ofautomated
teller machines and point of sale payment systems is another other example of a

closed, proprietary network that operates on a global scale. Visa, MasterCard, and
other major card issuers operate equivalent systems. U.C.C. Article 8 was revised
in 1994 in light of the electronic securities transfer system maintained by the
DepositoryTrust Company andtheNational Securities Clearing Corporationwhich
has dramatically reduced the reliance on paper certificates in national securities
markets. 95
Some of these new systems based on modem information technology
incorporate risk spreading, while others retain the decentralized, individualistic loss
allocation model that characterizes negotiability. Credit card and consumer EFT
transactions are subject to limits on the liability that can be imposed on consumers,

89. Id. at 961-62.
90. Id. at 985.
91. Rubin, supranote 32, at 791.
92. See James A. Newell & Michael R. Gordon, Electronic Commerce and Negotiable
Instruments (ElectronicPromissoryNotes), 31 IDAHO L. REV.819, 821 (1995).
93. Marie T. Reilly, The FDICas Holder in Due Course: Some Law and Economics, COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 165, 167-68 (1992).
94. U.C.C. Article 4A, Prefatory Note, Why is Article 4A Needed? (1995).
95. See U.C.C. Revised Article 8, Prefatory Note I(D) (1995).
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and as a result, those losses that cannot be imposed on merchants are shifted to the
financial institutions which are capable of spreading losses across their consumers'
accounts. These losses are then recaptured as higher user fees, which effectively
operate as a sort of insurance premium.96 Within the securities trading system, small
investors are protected by account insurance provided by the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation, but large investors are at risk if the securities intermediary
they have chosen becomes insolvent.97
The allocation of risks assumed by banks that make up the wholesale wire
transfer system (system banks) when executing their clients' funds transfers is very
similar to the loss allocation system of classical negotiability. For example, U.C.C.
Article 4A provides that any bank which accepts an order from a client to wire
funds to another party must assume the risk of failure of any intermediary bank if
the funds transfer is not successful.9" This rule encourages the implementation of
loss reduction strategies by encouraging system banks to avoid intermediary banks
whose solvency is at risk, but does not permit any risk-pooling between system
participants. As a loss imposition rule, it places the losses such as those caused by
the unexpected default of a customer or another bank on the bank that dealt most
proximately with the defaulting party. Also, when combined with the requirement
that the "money-back guarantee" may not be waived by agreement,99 it prevents the
bank bearing the loss from shifting the loss to a more remote party. A similar result
is achieved in many negotiable instrument cases through the operation of
indorsement and warranty liability rules.
There are still many commercial transactions in which negotiability (or
something like it) plays an important role, although this method is clearly becoming
obsolete. Perhaps one obvious successor to negotiability in modem commercial
practice are the decentralized, individualistic loss allocation systems used in some
modem commercial transaction systems. This type of loss allocation system is not
often found in consumer transactions; however, regulatory and market pressures
have supported the development of transaction systems for consumer use that

96. Consumer credit card liability for unauthorized use is limited to $50. RegulationZ, 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.12(b)(1) (1997). Consumer liability for unauthorized electronic funds transfers may be capped
at $50 or $500, depending on the promptness of the consumer in reporting the problem. If the
consumer fails to report an unauthorized transfer within 60 days after the financial institution sends
a statement, the consumers possible losses may not be capped. Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)
(1997). If a consumer protests a credit card charge as fraudulent, the loss is shifted to the merchant
who originated the charge; alternatively, if recovery from the merchant is not possible, then the
acquiring bank who granted a provisional credit on the charge to the merchant is liable. EDWARD L.
RUBIN &ROBERT

COOTER,

THEPAYMENT SYSTEM:

CASES,

MATERIALS AND ISSUES 781 (2d ed. 1994).

The loss spreading within the credit card system takes place when the acquiring bank raises its
customers' fees to cover its losses due to merchant fraud.
97. See James Steven Rogers, PolicyPerspectiveson Revised U.CC. Article 8,43 UCLAL. REV.

1431, 1469 (1996).
98. U.C.C. § 4A-402(e) (1995). This is the wholesale wire transfer system's "money back

guarantee" to its customers. If the customer designates the intermediary bank, however, it does not
apply. Id.
99. U.C.C. § 4A-402(f) (1995).
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negotiability, was historically tied with a loss allocation regime that did not support
loss-spreading, the modem example of retail check guarantee services shows that
negotiability is not incompatible with loss spreading. However, modem electronic
transactions systems based on public or private registries have no close historical
tie with any system of loss allocation. Some modem electronic systems incorporate
a forced insurance system and risk-pooling, while others permit the parties to selfinsure and take full responsibility for their own risk management solutions.
Today, the Internet is the frontier of electronic commerce. The Internet offers
the promise of transaction costs far below those incurred by transaction systems that
rely on mainframe computers and closed, proprietary networks. However, the
Internet will not host a large volume of commercial transactions conducted over the
Internet until transactors feel satisfied that Internet commerce security approaches
that of closed-networks electronic commerce systems. In addition, business
solutions must be standardized to permit intersystem compatibility within an open
network. Digital signature technology represents the first attempt to resolve some
of the security and standardization problems posed by the open, public nature of the
Internet.

III. WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES, AND WHAT BUSINESS
OBJECTIVES DO THEY SERVE?

A. Militaryand Commercial Use ofSymmetric Key Cryptography
Digital signatures are a specific application of encryption technology, or
cryptography. In turn, cryptography is one element of the larger field of information
and computer system security. Computer security takes into account many factors,
"including various technical safeguards, trustworthy and capable personnel, high
degrees of physical security, competent administrative oversight, and good
operational procedures."'' 0 Until very recently, cryptography has been one of the
least used of the available technical safeguards.' When it has been used, the
mechanics of its deployment have not been widely disseminated. Thus, the
appropriate role of cryptographic tools in commercial transaction systems has not
been as widely debated or analyzed as other issues at the intersection ofinformation
technology and commercial law."02
Various forms of encryption have been used to maintain the confidentiality of
information for over four thousand years.'0 3 Encryption involves transforming the

100. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION

SOCIETY 51 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S.Lin eds., 1996).
I01. Id. at 51-52.
102. For example, the introduction of computerized check processing technology in the 1950s
spurred debate over electronic payment system issues, and the commercial use of the telegraph in the
nineteenth century originated electronic contract formation issues thathave been widely debated since
the 1980s. See generally RUBIN &COOTER, supra note 96, at 108-111 (discussing the development of
the law of check collection systems).
103. See DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS 68 (1967).
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Encryption involves transforming the

text to be protected into a fonn that cannot be deciphered without having a copy of
the key used to modify the original text. Simple cryptographic systems operate on
the same principle as Captain Midnight decoder rings: a "cipher" is established to
transform text into a secure form. The original text is called the "plaintext," and the
transformed text is known as the "ciphertext."' ' For example, if the cipher is the
alphabet in reverse order, then the plaintext "Captain Midnight" becomes the
ciphertext "Xzkgzrm Nrwmrtsg." The process of converting plaintext to ciphertext
is a function of the encryption algorithm.'
In 1949, Claude Shannon established the scientific basis for modem
cryptography with the development of information theory which provided a
mathematical basis for analyzing cryptographic systems.0 6 Modem encryption
technology is based on using a complex mathematical function in combination with
a unique number which serves as the encryption key to transform plaintext into
ciphertext. Once a message has been encrypted, it can be decrypted by running it
through a second complex function together with an encryption key.0 7 In private
key, or symmetric cryptography, the same secret key is used both to encrypt and
decrypt. In public key, or asymmetric cryptography, two different but
mathematically related keys are used for encryption and decryption.' Some of the
relevant differences between public key and symmetric key cryptosystems in
electronic commerce are discussed below.
The quality of encryption technology security is measured by how resistant an
encrypted message is to being decrypted by someone who does not have the secret
key.10 9 The simplest way to try to break an encoded message is a "brute force"
attack, which consists of trying every possible key until the correct key is found. "0
"Because of the rapidly decreasing cost of computation, cryptographic systems that
cost $1 billion to break in 1945 can be broken for approximately $10 today."'
Because this trend is expected to continue into the future, cryptographic systems
being designed to support electronic commerce applications today should have large
safety margins to protect against the effects of future advances in technology.
Although the functions used to encrypt and decrypt messages are available on
many computers, controlling access to the encryption key ensures the
confidentiality of the encrypted message." 2
The longer the encryption key, the harder it is for someone without access to

103. See DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS 68 (1967).
104. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 374.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 364. Shannon's seminal work is CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1963).
107. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 374.

108. Id. at 375.
109. See id. at 378.
110. Id. at 379-81.
111. Id. at 384.
112. Id. at 377.
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the key to decrypt the ciphertext. The length of the number used for the secret key
is expressed in bits, such as a 56-bit key. Each bit in a key can be 1 or 0, so for a 56bit key there are 256, or 72,057,594,037,900,000, possible different keys."' The
Data Encryption Standard (DES), adopted as a U.S. government standard in 1977
and as an American National Standards Institute Standard in 1981, uses a 56-bit
key." 4 If the attacker had the capability to test a billion keys a second, it would take
834 days to test all possible keys."1 ' In other words, by using technology available
in 1998, it is possible for someone with enough time and money to break a message
encrypted with a 56-bit key. In 1996, a computer equipped with an application
specific chip could test 30 million DES keys per second." 6 It is estimated that a
government agency willing to invest $300 million in an array of such chips could
break a DES key in 12 seconds. 7 While it is unlikely that any government in the
world currently possesses such equipment, rapidly falling prices for information
processing power make it difficult to predict when
a government's security or
18
military agencies will possess such capabilities
A longer key makes the encryption more difficult to crack by several orders of
magnitude. According to another estimate, it would take 70,000 years to decrypt a
file protected by an 80-bit key using technology available in 1998.9 To decrypt a
message encrypted with a 128-bit key with technology available in 1998, it would
take longer than current estimates for the life of the universe. 2 ' Thus, while
cracking any message encrypted with modem encryption technology is not easy,
encryption with longer secret keys is significantly more secure.
The first applications of computer-based encryption technology in the United
States were in the military and financial institutions.' In response to military
needs, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) developed early computer security
standards. By the 1980s, the DoD issued Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC) as standards for information system security, including the
management of cryptosystems. Although systems developed according to TCSEC
are considered trustworthy systems, the standards in TCSEC reflect conditions that
characterize military rather than private commercial security applications." For
example, TCSEC places more emphasis on confidentiality and less emphasis on
integrity and availability of resources, issues of greater concern in private

113. SIMsoN GARPINKEL, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE 190 (1997).
114. Id. at 193. Garfinkel notes that the DES command only gives access to keys expressed as
hexidecimal numbers, which reduces the number of keys actually available in DES by 90% to
7,213,895,789,838,340 (96'). Id. at 190.
115. Id.

116. DONAL O'MAHONY ET AL.,

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS

24 (1997).

117. Id.
118. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 300 (2d ed. 1996).
119. William Wong, How Safe is Internet Traffic?, PC WEEK, Oct. 27, 1997, at 116, 118. In

1993, a computer capable of breaking DES keys in 3.5 hours was estimated to cost $1 million.
SCHNEIER, supra note 118, at 300.
120. Id.
121. RITA C. SUMMERS, SECURE COMPtIrNG: THREATS AND SAEouARDs 41(1997).
122. Id.
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information systems. 23 TCSEC also reflects the security concerns of an earlier
generation of computer technology, which becomes more apparent as multiuser
mainframe computers are displacedby distributed computer networks. Furthermore,
compatibility of security standards between users is a crucial issue for electronic
commerce that was not addressed in TCSEC.'24 Similarly, secure military
messaging systems developed for DoD are poorly suited for commercial
applications because they rely on a rigid hierarchy and facilitate top-down
communications only. 1
United States banking and financial institutions have created a vast and highly
reliable network of computers thatprovide electronic funds transfers throughout the
world. The movement toward automated financial services began in the 1950s with
the expansion of retail banking services and the development of "full service"
banking. 126 The automation of the check collection process and the movement of
banks into the credit card business reflect this trend. In the 1960s, banks began to
develop EFT systems using computer technology that had been acquired to support
check processing. A nationwide EFT network was established, including a chain
of ACHs and networks of automated teller machines (ATM). 27 The 1970s brought
predictions that the checkless society was imminent, based on the assumption that
the electronic funds transfer system would expand to include point-of-sale (POS)
payment functions. However, the public proved more resistant to the replacement
of paper checks with electronic funds transfers than anticipated, and it was not until
the 1990s that retail POS EFT services began to achieve significant market share.'
During the 1960s and 1970s, the wholesale wire transfer system was developed
for the commercial banking services market. In the early 1970s, Fedwire was
created to automate funds transfers through the Federal Reserve System. At the
same time, the New York Clearinghouse Association established CHIPS. The
Society for Worldwide Interbank Fund Transfers (SWIFT) began operations in
1977 as a secure communications network that, unlike the Fedwire or CHIPS, does
not provide settlement functions. 29
Through the development of these and other proprietary systems such as the
communications networks that provide for central-switch transmission ofmessages
between participants in the credit card system, financial service providers in the
United States have built one of the largest electronic commerce networks in the
world. In developing these networks and the services they support, financial

123. By contrast, digital signature technology does not provide confidentiality of the message
text, but guarantees the integrity of the message and protection against its later repudiation by the
apparent sender. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
124. SUMMERS, supranote 121.
125. See FORD & BAUM, supranote 9, at 271.
126. See DONALD L BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANsFERS
1.01 (3d ed. 1996).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. 1.03[9].
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institutions have developed comprehensive approaches to security.'30 This includes
policies to safeguard the financial institution's central processing facilities from
physical damage, breaches in employee security procedures, and software
failures. 3 ' In addition, encryption maybe used for communications between remote
locations and the central processing facilities.' 32 To secure customer access at
remote locations, financial institutions will generally issue cards and personal
identification numbers to customers which control access to customer funds. In
addition, financial remote access providers may take steps in designing the ATM
facility, such as installing a surveillance camera, to minimize the risk that customers
will be attacked or observed while accessing funds.'
With the exception of possessing a magnetic strip card or remembering the
personal identification number (PIN) for consumer EFT access devices, security
systems are transparent to the retail consumer of electronic financial services.
Because of consumer protection regulations, financial service providers absorb the
costs of most security failures of retail financial electronic service networks, even
if caused by the consumer.' 34 This allocation of liability in favor of the institutional
transactor has prompted institutional participants in these systems to invest heavily
in security technology. Security procedures now used by credit card issuers to
combat fraud include mailing inactive cards that require cardholders to make
contact with the issuer by telephone to activate the card, placing holograms on the
card to make reproduction of the card more difficult, placing a photograph of the
cardholder on the card to improve the accuracy of identification checks, and
encoding the magnetic strip with algorithms that aid in matching the card with the
'
In addition, neural network technology can be used to
proper cardholder. 35
compare cardholder usage with known patterns of fraud, and expert or rules-based
systems can be programmed to react when established parameters of activities are
36
exceeded.'
In commercial wire transfer services, the customer and the bank must agree to
commercially reasonable security procedures for the bank to avoid liability for
unauthorized transfers from the customer's account.'37 If a bank has executed an
unauthorized funds transfer instruction after the bank has established an
economically reasonable security pro cedure, the bank's customer can avoid liability
for the amount of the funds transfer by showing that the bank did not follow the
security procedure, or the instruction did not originate with personnel or facilities

130. See Susan Hubbell Nycum, Securityfor ElectronicFunds Transfer System, 37 U. PiTr. L.
REv. 709, 710 (1976).
131. BAKER & BRAI DEL, supranote 126, 19.05[l].
132. Id. 19.05[2].
133. Id. 19.05[3].
134. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (1997); Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1997).
135. Technology Stems Credit Card Fraud,13:24 Financial Services Report, Nov. 20, 1996,
availablein LEXIS, Bankng Library, Philps File.

136. Id.
137. SeeU.C.C. § 4A-202(a), (b) (1995); U.C.C. § 4A-201 (1995) (defintionof"security procedure").
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under the customer's control.33 The loss allocation rules place the risk of
unauthorized payment orders initially on the bank, but permit the bank to shift
liability to the customer by insuring that the customer implements a commercially
reasonable security procedure. However, if the customer can meet the substantial
burden of proving that a loss was not his or her fault, then the bank is forced to
absorb the loss.
Symmetric cryptography is commonly employed within well-established
electronic financial services networks. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is the
most widely used form of encryption technology in financial services networks. 39
In the early 1970s, when the military accounted for most cryptography research,
IBM developed and marketed the DES algorithm. At the same time IBM was
independently developing DES, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), later
renamed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), issued a call
for proposals of a standard encryption algorithm."' After testing the algorithm to
determine its security and suitability for a national standard, the NBS entered into
a nonexclusive, royalty-free license that permitted the use of DES as a standard
form of encryption. After a period of public comment, DES was adopted as a
federal standard in 1976.141 In 1981, the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) approved DES as a private sector standard. The ANSI Financial Institution
Retail Security Working Group developed a DES-based standard for authentication
of retail financial messages. The American Bankers Association also adopted a
standard recommending DES for encryption."2 Because the DES algorithm has
been widely known and used for decades, financial institutions may use Triple-DES
as an alternative to DES to decrease the possibility that a DES could be decrypted
by a simple brute-force attack. 43 Triple-DES uses the DES algorithm three times,
incorporating two different keys to achieve greater security, and is an appealing
4
choice for financial institutions which have already installed DES equipment.'
DES is a symmetric key cryptography system, which means the same key is
used to encrypt and decrypt the plaintext. The administration of symmetric key
systems within closed systems is a serious but not unmanageable problem. The
primary key management problem within symmetric key systems is finding a way
to distribute the keys to those who need them without compromising the security
of the keys in transit. 4 5 One solution is to take a page from the old James Bond
novels, give the key to a courier in a sealed briefcase, and handcuff the briefcase to
the courier. If the courier fails to arrive or the seal is broken, then the key is

138. See U.C.C. § 4A-202(b), 4A-203(a)(2) (1995). The customer might also be able to avoid
liability by showing the bank acted in bad faith. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b)(ii) (1995).
139. SCHNEIER, supra note 118, at 265-268.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. O'MAHoNY ET AL., supra note 116 at 25.

144.Id.
145. SIMSoN GMUINKL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY 45 (1995).
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presumed compromised and not used.'" The overhead associated with such a
distribution system may not be significant in the context of national security during
the Cold War, but is obviously too great for mainstream electronic commerce
applications today. Another shortcoming of symmetric key cryptography is that it
cannot be used between parties with no prior contact because they must first find
a way to share copies ofthe key. One solution is to create a central key distribution
system. However, a key distribution system may create more problems than it
solves because the individuals who run the key distribution system may not be as
trustworthy as they should be.'47 The key management problems of symmetric key
cryptography can be avoided by using asymmetric or public key encryption, which
is the heart of digital signatures.
B. PublicKey Cryptographyand Its Promisefor Open Network Commerce
The first public key system was described in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and
Martin Hellman. 4 A short time later, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len
Adelman developed another public key system. 49 The great advantage of a public
key system is that it permits individuals to use two different but related keys to
maintain the confidentiality of their communications. One key, the private key, is
kept secret by the owner, while the other key, the public key, can be widely
distributed. The two keys are mathematically related, but one of the features of
public key cryptography is that it is computationally infeasible to derive one key
from knowledge of the other.
It is a convention among those who try to explain public key cryptography to
the uninitiated to use hypotheticals populated with Alice, Bob, and Carol.'"0 In a
public key cryptography system, Alice and Bob exchange public keys. When Bob
wants to communicate securely with Alice, he uses her public key to encrypt a
message, confident that no one other than Alice may decrypt the message. If Alice
wants to send Bob a message and provide Bob with confidence that it must have
come from Alice, Alice may encrypt her message with her private key. After Bob
receives the message, he decrypts it with his copy of Alice's public key, certain that
the message originated with Alice.
The most secure system for exchanging keys in a public key cryptography
system is like the most secure system for distributing private keys: a face-to-face
transaction between parties with a prior acquaintance. If Alice and Bob feel
confident of the security of their e-mail communications, they can exchange public

146. Id. at 42.
147. Id. at 46.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Id.
150. I have been unable to track down the origin of this convention. The first initials of the
names are not an adequate explanation because there are many common given names in English that
begin with A, B, and C. It helps the clarity of the explanation, however, to have different genders
because then the referents ofpersonal pronouns remain clear. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential
Role of Trusted ThirdPartiesin Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. R v. 49, 51-56 (1996).
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keys via e-mail. If Alice and Bob have no prior dealings, however, they may be
reluctant to trust simple e-mail.
The usefulness of public key cryptography is not limited to guaranteeing the
confidentiality of messages. The digital signature function of public key
cryptography can also be used to identify the party sending a message without
encrypting the text. A digital signature is produced by first running the message to
be signed through a hash function program that produces a digest of the entire
message.5 1 One characteristic of this message digest is that if any change is made
to the message, when the message is run through the hash function again, it will
produce a totally different digest. Once this digest has been computed, the digest
is encrypted with the private key of the sender, Alice. This encrypted digest is the
digital signature. The plaintext of the message is sent to the recipient, Bob, together
with the digital signature. Bob, who must already be in possession ofAlice's public
key, runs the message through the same hash function and produces a message
digest independently. Bob then uses Alice's public key (the public key of the
signer) to decrypt the digest that was appended by Alice to the message. If the two
digests are identical, then Bob can reasonably have a high degree of confidence that
only Alice (or someone who obtained control of Alice's key) sent the message, and
that the text of the message has not been tampered with in transit.
However, even public key cryptography does not eliminate the problem of how
to administer the distribution of keys. Someone might establish a"Get to Know Bill
Gates" web site, generate a matched key pair and post the public key to the web site
for anyone in the world to download and use in their correspondence with "Bill
Gates." Yet no sensible person would believe that the person with whom they were
communicating by using this key and the e-mail address on the web site was
actually the chief executive officer of Microsoft.
There are various solutions to the problem of distributing public keys in a
manner that gives the recipient confidence that the public key belongs to the person
to whom it appears to belong. One solution was advanced by Phil Zimmerman, who
wrote a public key cryptography program, called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), for
use by private citizens.'s5 The "web of trust' ' 3 allows each person using PGP to
have the option of certiflying that other keys do indeed belong to the individuals
who purport to use them."5 Whenever a PGP user receives a key, the user is given
the opportunity to review the other PGP users' certification of the key, and is asked
to make a notation in the program regarding the degree to which the user trusts the
authenticity of the identity of the purported user. To return to Alice and Bob, Bob
may be a complete stranger to Alice, but Bob had his key certified by Carol, who
is a good friend ofAlice's. When PGP tells Alice that Carol has certified Bob's key,
Alice may be willing to trust that the person sending her what purports to be Bob's

151. FoRD &BAUM, supra note 9, at 113.
152. See GARIINKEL, supra note 145, at 85-103.
153. Id.

154. Id.

1998]

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES

'
public key is in fact Bob. 55
The Digital Signature Guidelines focus on the possibility of using a trusted
third party, known as a "certification authority" (CA), to bind the identity of a
person in the material world with the use of a specific key pair in an online
environment. 56 The Digital Signature Guidelines define a certification authority as
"[a] person who issues a certificate."' 57 The procedure used by a CA to review an
application from a prospective subscriber maybe one of the CA practices described
in a "certification practice statement" (CPS).' 58 In order to issue certificates for
subscribers' public keys, the CA must have a "trustworthy system.' ' 159 If the CA
operates a trustworthy system, the CA will be able to provide reliable "timestamps" for issuance of certificates, thus allowing relying parties to know with
certainty the time when the certificate will expire and reliance on it would no longer
be reasonable.' 6 ° What level of system security is appropriate to achieve a
trustworthy system is a question that can only be 6resolved in light of the all
circumstances under which the system will be used.' 1
To return to the story of Alice and Bob, we can now introduce Carol, the CA.
Assuming that Alice and Bob do not have any prior acquaintance, then Carol can
perform an invaluable service of permitting Alice and Bob to make each other's
acquaintance in an online environment and to have confidence that they know with
whom they are dealing. Bob sends his public key to Alice included in Carol's
certificate, which includes, among other things, a copy of Bob's public key signed
by Carol's private key. 62 If Alice has a copy of Carol's public key that she believes

155. Id. at 235.
156. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supranote 6, at 80. See also Froomkin, supra note 150,
at 49-50. ("This article aims to describe what CAs do, explain why they are important to electronic
commerce, and suggest that they are likely to provoke some interesting legal problems.").
157. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supranote 6, at 37. Section 1.23 defines "person" as "[a]
human being or an organization (or a device under the control thereof which is capable of signing a
message or verifying a digital signature)."Id. at 58. Section 1.16 defines "issue a certificate" as "[t]he
acts of a certification authority in creating a certificate and notifying the subscriber listed in the
certificate ofthe contents ofthe certificate." Id.at 50. Section 1.5 defines "certificate" as "[a] message
which at least (1) identifies the certification authority issuing it, (2) names or identifies its subscriber,
(3) contains the subscriber's public key, (4) identifies its operational period, and (5) is digitally signed
by the certification authority issuing it." Id. at 35.
158. Id. at 39-40. A CPS is "[a] statement ofthe practices which a certification authority employs
in issuing certificates." Id.
159. Section 1.35 defines trustworthy system as "[c]omputerhardware, software, andprocedures
that: (1) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (2) provide a reasonably reliable level of
availability, reliability and correct operation; (3) are reasonably suited to performing their intended
functions; and (4) adhere to generally accepted security principles." Id. at 69.
160. Id. at 66.
161. Id. cmt. 1.35.3, at 71.
162. It is possible to view actual digital signature certificates in most recent releases of popular
webbrowserprograms. For example, inNetscape Communicator 4.0, certificates stored in thebrowser
program can be viewed by choosing the "Communicator" menu, and then selecting "Security Info"
from the list of options on the Communicator menu. A dialog box appears that provides information
on many aspects of Communicator's security functions, including certificates. Certificates are
organized into groups of "Yours," "People," "Web sites," and "Signers." The category of signers is
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to be trustworthy, then she can use that public key to verify Carol's signature on the
certificate. Once she has successfully verified Carol's public key, Alice can have
have confidence that Bob's key is what it purports to be. Using Carol's CA
services, however, solves one problem-whether to trust that Bob's public key
actually has some connection to the human being Bob with whom Alice believes
she is dealing-only if two new problems can also be solved. These problems are:
(1) whether Alice understands the degree of scrutiny applied by Carol before
issuing Bob a certificate and has thought about whether that degree of scrutiny is
appropriate for the use Alice has in mind for Bob's key; and (2) whether there is a
system for distributing Carol's keys that inspires the confidence of people like Alice
and Bob that they do actually have a copy of Carol's key.
C. Risk Allocation Systems for EmergingElectronic Commerce Systems
The manner in which public key cryptography is used to create a digital
signature is quite clear and unproblematic; however, the larger institutional
framework within which public key cryptography will be administered is still quite
controversial. At one extreme ofthe spectrum of possible public key infrastructures
(PKI) is the PGP web of trust model, and at the other extreme are the closed and
highly regulated models developed for military use of public key cryptography. The
web of trust is a wholly decentralized, user-controlled system of evaluating the
trustworthiness of key as compared to the U.S. Department of Defense's rigidly
hierarchical, top-down PKI. 63 Most proposed or existing PKIs, including the CA
model proposed in the Digital Signature Guidelines, are somewhere in between the
military model and the web of trust." The members of the Information Security
Committee of the ABA Science and Technology division are working to develop
standards inmany areas surrounding the administration ofPKIs,'65 as is the Internet
Council of the National Automated Clearing House Association.'" These groups
directed their work toward finding a viable solution to the problems facing Alice

reserved for certificate authorities, who are "certificate signers." The certificates of many commercial
CAs are installed in the browser program automatically. This enables the browser to verify
automatically a digital signature certificate offered by an Internet commerce web site without
requiring the individual using the browser program to take the necessary steps to obtain the CA's
certificate.
163. FORD & BAUM, supra note 9, at 270.
164. See id. at 263-314 (describing several different model PKIs in chapter 7).
165. For information about the work of the Information Security Committee, see ABA Section
ofScience & Tech., Elec. Commerce Div., Information Security CommitteeHome Page (visited May
5, 1998) <http://www.abanet.orglscitech/ec/isc/home.html>. In early 1998, the Accreditation
Workgroup was drafting Guidelines for Certificate Policies and Accreditation Criteria that it hopes
to finalize later this year. Id. The ABA Committee on Cyberspace Law has also undertaken major
projects addressing issues raised by the impact ofthe Internet on commercial law, which are described
at ABA Section of Business Law, Committee on CyberspaceLaw (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cybert>.
166. Information about the Internet Council is available at The Internet Council (last modified
Mar. 9, 1998) <http:llwww.nacha.org/tic/default.htm>.
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when she decides whether to rely on Carol's certificate.
While digital signature technology was not developed with the Internet in mind,
it offers tremendous promise as a solution to several problems associated with using
the Internet for business transactions. The Internet began in 1969 as a federally
subsidized network among universities and government research laboratories with
possible military applications. 67 The Department of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency funded the development of the Internet during the 1970s. 68 The
Internet developed as a distributed, packet switching network that could continue
functioning even if parts of the network were disabled.'69 The technical standards
that define the Internet are all public, permitting the computer hardware of any
manufacture and many different types of software and operating systems to
integrate into the network. 70 Among the most important Internet applications are
e-mail, electronic bulletin boards, file transfer protocols that permit downloading
files from remote locations, protocols that support remote access to different
via hyperlinks or searching,
computers on the network, and information browsing
17 1
interface.
user
graphical
a
without
or
with
either
While the Internet may be uniquely suited for disseminating information, 72 its
openness and flexibility render it highly insecure, especially in comparison with
existing large scale computernetworks supporting electronic financial services. The
technology which facilitates the free flow of information over the Internet also
leaves gaping holes where computer vandals and criminals can break into systems
connected to the Internet. Once malfeasors have gained unauthorized access to an
unprotected or poorly secured site, that site may become the launching point for
further attacks, exposing the owner of the hacked site to not only the cost of
repairing damage to his or her own site, but possible liability to third parties. Many
technical flaws have emerged in software designed to support electronic commerce
over the Internet, and while publicized bugs have been corrected, the number of
bugs notyet detected is unclear. Information system security problems are complex,
designing trustworthy systems is very difficult, and the amount of reliable
information about Internet security available to many users is inadequate even for
a diligent or careful person to learn to take adequate precautions.
While the Internet has made the topic of electronic commerce more visible than
ever, many of the issues debated in the Internet electronic commerce context
actually have much broader relevance. The manner in which computer and
communications technology is used by businesses is rapidly transforming, and the
integration of Internet functions and resources is only one piece of the puzzle. 7 s

167. FORD & BAUM, supra note 9, at 17.

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 18.
172. U.S. District Court Judge Stewart Dalzell labeled the Internet "the most participatory form •

of mass speech yet developed .... " ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
173. JonWilliam Toigo, EnterpriseComputingPlatformEvolution: Technology Trends Change
as Fastas FashionStyles, 11 ENTERPRisE Sys. J. 54 (1996) (WOT).
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Many types of business information processing are migrating from mainframe
computers toward networked computer systems, which entails a move away from
offline, batch processing of data to online, real time processing of data. Enterprise
resource management software can replace older, hierarchical, compartmentalized
legacy computing systems and can offer competitive advantages to companies that
effectively use distributed computing services. As enterprises provide customers
and employees with greater access to information technology, the physical and
technological security of older systems will no longer adequately secure
commercial operations. Presently no equivalent to generally accepted accounting
principles exists for the analysis of information system security issues within
emerging models of business information technology. 74 Until a consensus emerges
on precisely what security is necessary to conduct commerce over open networks
such as the Internet, the representatives of various industries that are already
established players inthe electronic commerce arena and the representatives ofnew
players working to bring new technologies to market will likely vigorously debate
what constitutes reasonable commercial practices with regard to information
security.
The Digital Signature Guidelines represent one of the first attempts to develop
a comprehensive business model, including a risk allocation system, for the
deployment of digital signature technology in electronic commerce. 7 ' The primary
focus of the Guidelines is on a specific technology, public key cryptography, and
developing a legal framework which might encourage transactors to deploy that
technology. The business application the drafters apparently used as the test case
in drawing up the recommendations in the Guidelines was quite different from the
type of business applications commonly found in electronic commerce today. This
test case was a business transaction between two parties who have no prior contact
in either the online environment or the physical world and who want to enter into
a contract to be performed entirely online. 76 The drafters apparently assumed that
they could eliminate the most significant obstacles to the deployment of digital
signature technology in electronic commerce by drafting a solution that worked for

174. For example, in 1991, the U.S. National Research Council called for the development of
such a system in its report, Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age, National
Academy Press, 1991. In 1992, OECD issued its Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems
which contained general principles that might serve as a foundation for a statement of detailed
generally accepted system security principles. Winn, supra note 5. In 1998, it was not yet apparent
what concrete steps have been taken toward the development of such a set ofprinciples. See Winn,
supra note 5 (discussing the guideline proposals).
175. DIGrTAL. SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 6. 1 was not aware of the drafting process of
the Guidelines, let alone part of it, so I cannot comment on the drafting process from the perspective
of a participant. However, I have talked at length with quite a few of the participants, and the
following discussion is based on certain points about which there seems to be a consensus.
176. This fact pattern is sometimes referred to as an "open system" but there are apparently as
many different interpretations of open system as there are individuals using the term. The ABA
Science and Technology Section Information Security Committee has a working group trying to
develop a comprehensive taxonomy of situations in which public key cryptography mightbe deployed
and to define standard terms to refer to those situations.
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this most extreme case. They thought that less radical applications of this
technology, such as in dealings between two parties who have had sustained prior
contact in either the online environment or the physical world, were inherently less
intractable, and therefore less urgently needed a framework such as that proposed
in the Guidelines.' 77
The Guidelines do not contain a detailed discussion of how strangers with no
prior relationship might conduct electronic commerce in the future; however, the
roles assigned to the CA, the subscriber, and the relying party to a digital signature
transaction make sense under the assumption that many such transactions will take
place in the future. The model CA reflected in the Digital Signature Guidelines is
based on the assumption that a contractual relationship will exist between the CA
and the subscriber but not between the CA and the relying party. One can obviously
imagine a system in which a CA enters into contractual relationships with
prospective relying parties, researching and certifying the digital signatures of
prospective transactors for the express benefit of the relying party. Instead, the
maintenance ofa "certificate revocation list" (CRL) by the CA protects the interests
of the relying party in the Digital Signature Guidelines. Before relying on a
certificate, relying parties should check the CRL to determine if it has been revoked
by the CA or canceled at the request of the subscriber.
In the event either the subscriber or the relying party suffers a loss in a
transaction in which one of the CA's certificates was used to authenticate a digital
signature, the Guidelines may abrogate the right of either party to proceed against
the CA.' This safe harbor provides that a CA is not liable to either a subscriber or
a relying party if it has complied with the terms of its own CPS and complied with
the provisions of the Guidelines. 79 The Comments to this section explain that this
protection for the CA against liability arising outside the terms of its CPS or a
statute based on the Guidelines was felt to be necessary to induce responsible
parties to play the essential role of CA in this uncharted area of commercial
transactions."' This has proved to be a controversial provision of the Guidelines
that few legislatures have chosen to adopt.' The Utah and Washington digital

177. Fact patterns in which the parties using public key cryptography already stand in some
defined relationship to each other are sometimes referred to as "closed systems," but this term is as
ambiguous as its logical inverse, open system.
178. DIGIrrAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 3.14, at 99-100.
179. Id.
180. Id. cmt. 3.14.1, at 100.
181. Many states have considered, but few have adopted, digital signature legislation which
follows the proposals ofthe Digital Signature Guidelines. For an analysis of electronic commerce and
digital signature initiatives taken through fall 1997, see Internet Law &Policy Forum, Survey ofState
Electronic & DigitalSignatureLegislative Initiatives (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.ilpf.org/digsig/digrep.htm>. For a current survey of various legislative initiatives
regarding electronic commerce and digital signatures, see McBride, Baker & Coles, Summary of
Electronic Commerce andDigitalSignatureLegislation (last modified Mar. 10, 1998)
<http://mbc.com/dssum.html>. For some criticisms of the approach taken in the Guidelines, see
Biddle, MisplacedPriorities,supranote 12, at 1166-67; Biddle, PolicyQuestions,supranote 12; and
Winn, supra note 5. Another controversial safe harbor provision in the Guidelines, the presumption
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signature statutes, enacted originally in 1995 and 1996 respectively, adopted
comprehensive licensing regimes to provide public oversight of CAs before a CA
could qualify for a safe harbor from liability outside the terms of the CA's CPS or
the relevant statutory regime.' 2
This drafting strategy is fundamentally at odds with the strategy of the drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 83 The U.C.C. was designed to restate and
modernize the existing law governing certain categories of commercial transactions,
and as a result was essentially more conservative and historical in orientation than
the Digital Signature Guidelines. The U.C.C. aims to create certainty for transactors
by building on existing trade usages and commercial practices while retaining
enough flexibility to cope with inevitable innovations. The Guidelines, by contrast,
were inspired by the desire to bring public key cryptography to a new audience;
thus, by definition there could not yet be any existing trade usages or commercial
practices to draw upon. Therefore, the Guidelines try to anticipate the future
commercial applications. For example, the Guidelines draw on engineering
standards such as the ITUISO x.500 directory standard which provides a system
for controlling and accessing information about names and identities.184
The focus of the Guidelines on a transaction between two strangers, who might
be located in different countries but who are brought together for the first time
online, has certain structural similarities with the "courier without luggage" concept
emphasized in Chief Justice Gibson's opinion in Overton v. Tyler.'85 In order for a
contract representing a right to payment to circulate as the equivalent of currency,
it had to comply with strict formal standards limiting the terms the parties could use
in drawing up the instrument.'"5 The commercial benefit conferred by the rigid
formalism of negotiable instruments law was the creation of the financial liquidity
necessary to grease the wheels of early nineteenth century commerce. Public key
cryptography offers the promise of providing a secure framework in which
transactors will have enough confidence to participate in the global Internet market,
thus greasing the wheels of twenty-first century commerce. In order for digital
signatures to operate as the twenty-first century equivalent of Gibson's nineteenthcentury "courier without luggage," universally recognized formal standards will
have to be established to permit the interoperability of separately administered
that a digital signature is the signature of the party identified in the certificate, is discussed below.
See infra text accompanying notes 227-30.
182. For the licensing provisions of the relevant statutes, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201 to 204 (Supp. 1997), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.34.100-.101 (West Supp. 1998).
183. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1953)
(describing the purpose of the UCC); Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolesence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV.
461,461 (1967) (discussing the reasons for and history of the codifications of commercial law).
184. The x.500 directory standard was developed by the International Consultative Committee
on Telegraphy and Telephony (ICCTr), later renamed the International Telecommunication Union-

Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (ITU-T), in collaboration with the International
Organization for Standards (ISO). DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 21.

185. 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846). For a discussion of the facts and holding of the case, see supratext
accompanying notes 3, 42.

186. Id.
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PKIs. Harmonious national and transnational standards governing the technological
and legal framework for the commercial use of public key cryptography will have
to be set before the transaction between strangers in the global electronic
marketplace can become a commercial reality."8 7
The difficulty of expanding the application of public key cryptography outside
of communities with a defined class of members is finding a way to permit one
party to evaluate and accept certificates issued by CAs with whom that party had
no prior dealings, just as existing national and transnational technology standards
permit telephone calls to connect any two places in the world. Scalability and
interoperabilty of PKIs may be a more difficult problem to solve than the problem
of telecommunications standards.' 8 In order to be successful, PKIs must resolve
both technical and legal issues, and the very considerable problems of designing
software and hardware to support transnational interoperability of digital signature
technology will be hampered until there is some consensus on the legal framework
within which it will be deployed. While the drafters of the Digital Signature
Guidelines hoped that the Guidelines would offer a framework around which a such
consensus could be crafted, in the months and years following the publication of the
'
Guidelines, that consensus appears to be growing ever more elusive. 89
The narrow focus of the Guidelines on an implementation of a radically new

technology seems to reflect a decision by the drafters that existing large-scale
electronic commerce applications have limited or no precedential value for their
enterprise. One further assumption implicit in the Digital Signature Guidelines
distinguishes the hypothetical fact pattern from virtually all electronic commerce
as it is conducted today: it would be uneconomical for the CA to establish
contractual privity with the relying party. The advantage to a CA of entering into
a contract with the relying party is that the CA can use the contract to limit his or
her exposure to the relying party for losses arising in a transaction in which the
CA's certificate had been used.'90 In existing electronic commerce systems, risks

187. For a more detailed discussion of some of the thorny problems that must be resolved, see
FORD & BAUM, supra note 9, at 265-281 (discussing Certification Authority Interrelationship

Structures).
188. International telecommunications are possible because of international engineering
standards established by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). For a discussion of the
history and operation of the ITU, see CARL CARGILL, OPEN SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION 211-214
(1996).
189. One observer has noted that the varying degrees of success enjoyed by those lobbying for
a comprehensive approach to digital signature legislation have produced such a bewildering array of
different laws that digital signature technology is in danger of being "loved to death" by its staunchest
(lastmodified
proponents. StewartA. Baker, InternationalDevelopmentsAffectingDigitalSignatures
Oct. 1997) <http://www.steptoe.com/digsig2.htm>.
190. Cf.Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to grant summary
judgment to a law firm that denied its liability to investors based on opinion letters the law firm issued
to an investment firm marketing tax shelters on the effectiveness of those investments as tax shelters
after the IRS disallowed the investments as tax shelters). The court noted that notwithstanding the
attempt of the law firm to limit its potential liability to investors by stating in the opinion letters that
they were for the exclusive use of the investment firm, the law firm knew that the investment firm was
distributing copies of the opinion letters to prospective investors to encourage them to invest. Id. at
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are managed through a combination of contracts, government regulation, and rules
for private membership organizations such as the clearinghouses that process funds
transfers. The drafters ofthe Digital Signature Guidelines seemed to assume that the
deployment of public key cryptography in those environments would not require
legislation along the lines suggested in the Guidelines because those parties had
already created a functional legal framework for their transactions that could be
adapted to incorporate new technologies.' 9 ' The development of the Secure
Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol by Visa International and MasterCard is an
example of the development of a public key infrastructure that will be integrated
into existing global networks.'92 The legal framework that supports Visa and
MasterCard, with the exception of certain key consumer protection regulations, is
provided by contracts between the parties. By 1998, however, the vigorous debate
taking place within trade associations such as the National Automated Clearing
House Association, 93 Commerce Net,'94 and the Financial Services Technology
Consortium (FSTC) 9 regarding the development of public key infrastructures for
existing electronic commerce systems indicates that the process of incorporating
public key cryptography and Internet communications into existing electronic
commerce systems may raise problems just as difficult as the fact pattern addressed
by the drafters of the Guidelines.
The whole concept of a digital signature certificate as a universal form of
identification in cyberspace seems more closely related to certain ministerial
functions performed by government officials in the conduct of official business than
it does to the type of services commercial parties require when entering into
contractual relationships with strangers, especially strangers in foreignjurisdictions.
Commercial parties commonly rely on services such as letters of credit offered by
banks in order to manage the risk in transnational trade, in which the contracting
parties expect the banks to confirm not only the identity of the other party to the
transaction, but.creditworthiness as well. Even the concept of a universal ID is
foreign to parties in the United States. While national ID cards are common outside
the United States, the closest thing Americans have to a national ID card is a
driver's license or a passport.
A second analogy can be drawn between the CA function in the Digital

487. Cases such as Kline indicate that a CA might reasonably be concerned about its ability to limit
its liability to the terms set out in its certification practice statement.
19 1. It must be noted that the Digital Signature Guidelines includes a formal disclaimer of any
intentby its drafters that the Guidelines be used as model legislation. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES,
supra note 6, at 23.
192. Information about SET can be accessed at the Visa web site at SET Secure Electronic
Transactionat Visa (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.visa.comlcgi-bin/vee/ntlecommlsetmain.html?2+O>.
193. Information about the National Automated Clearing House Association is available at
ElectronicPayments (last modified Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.nacha.org>.
194. Information about Commerce Net is available at Commerce Net (visited May 5, 1998)
<http:/www.commerce.nettresearch/presentations/eco/index.html>.
195. See Financial Services Technology Consortium, The BankInternetPayment System (visited
May 5, 1998) <http://wv'w.fstc.org/projects/bips/ndex.html>.
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Signature Guidelines and the function of a notary, who in the United States is an
independent party who generally lacks the professional qualifications of the notaire
in civil lawjurisdictions. 96 The CyberNotary Committee of the ABA Science and
Technology Committee has worked to develop the concept ofa "CyberNotary," but
it remains unclear if this concept will develop into a viable commercial service. 97
The physical world of business transactions has no commercial equivalent of this
service that the CA provides in the Guidelines. Thus, while the drafters of the
Guidelines seemed confident that the enhanced level of security that public key
cryptography provides would trigger a demand for CA services among businesses
migrating to Internet commerce, no real precedent in the United States supports
operating an identification service for profit. It remains unclear what kind of
business model will ultimately allow for-profit enterprises to offer digital signature
certification services for Internet transactions.
The business entity offering a service that most closely resembles the
description of a certification authority given in the Digital Signature Guidelines is
a privately held company called VeriSign, Inc. 98 VeriSign provides digital
signature certificates, which it calls "Digital IDs,"'99 and also provides certification
authority technology to third parties, which it refers to as "private label certificate
services."" According to an undated white paper entitled DigitallDsfor Servers:
High-level Security at a Low Cost, "over 1,500,000 VeriSign Client Digital IDs
have been issued to users of Netscape and Microsoft browsers. 2 0° In addition, the
white paper states that "[o]ver 45,000 commercial sites are using VeriSign Server
Digital IDs to create secure channels with customers."2 2 The white paper explains
how electronic commerce servers can be equipped with Digital IDs and then can
use the public key associated with the Digital ID to set up a secure channel of
communication between the remote computer running an Internet browser
application and the server using the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) communication
protocol. 0 3 The white paper adds that the next step in implementing client
authentication will be for electronic commerce servers to require their customers to

196. For a general discussion of the difference between the functions of notaries in the United
States and in civil lawjurisdictions, see RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGERET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES,
TEXT, MATERIALS 18-23 (5th ed. 1988).
197. See ABA Section ofScience and Technology Electronic Commerce Division, CyberNotary
Committee Home Page (visited May 5, 1998) <http://www.abanet.org/scitechlec/Cn/home.html>.
198. See eriSign Electronic Credentialsfor the Internet (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.com>.
199. See DigitallD's: The New Advantage (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.com/clientauth/whitepaper.html> (explaining Digital IDS).
200. VeriSign's private label services include support for the SET protocol being developed by
Visa International and MasterCard.
201. DigitalIDsfor Servers: High Level Security at a Low Cost (visited May 5, 1998)
<http.//www.verisign.com/products/sites/serverauth.html>. While many certificates havebeenissued,
it remains unclear how many have been used in commercial transactions.
202. Id.
203. Id.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:739

identify themselves with Digital IDs.2°
While VeriSign anticipates the use of Digital IDs to support the use of digital
signatures as described in the Digital Signature Guidelines in the near future, that
is not yet the primary application of the public key technology products it has
developed. Public key cryptography is being used instead to support the use of
symmetric or secret key cryptography to transport credit card information between
the Internet browser program on the consumer's computer and the retail merchant's
electronic comiferce server."° While the ability of the consumer to enter into a
secure communication channel with the Internet merchant increases the level of
confidence enjoyed by consumers that they are dealing with a legitimate web site,
the use of a Digital ID by the electronic commerce server does not amount to a
binding signature by the merchant on a contract with the consumer. Rather, the
entire transaction is a variant of telephone catalog sales. As with credit card sales
completed over the telephone, the merchant assumes the risk that the credit card use
is unauthorized. As such, the merchant is subject both to federal consumer
protection legislation and to the terms of its contract with the bank that acquires its
credit card charge authorizations regarding the consumer's right to demand a refund
of charges to his or her credit card account. 6
If the VeriSign white paper is correct that the next phase in Internet electronic
commerce will include the requirement that consumers use digital signatures and
that those digital signatures be certified by CAs such as VeriSign, the amount of
risk that the consumer is expected to bear in Internet transactions may dramatically
increase. If consumers are able to enter into binding contracts without the use of
credit cards and the consumer protections credit cards import, many of their rights
and obligations will be defined by the terms of their VeriSign Subscriber
Agreement,0 7 which incorporates by reference the terms of the VeriSign
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)."' However, consumers may have additional

204. Id.

205. See DigitalIds: The New Advantage (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://vww.verisign.com/clientauth/whitepaper.html> (illustrating the public key cryptography).
Symmetric key cryptography generates the session key that is used to encrypt all communication
between the consumer client computer and the merchant server computer. Symmetric key
cryptography is used because it is less computationally intensive than public key cryptography and
therefore less likely to slow down the response time of the consumer's computer in executing the
consumer's purchase instructions. Public key cryptography is used to solve the symmetric key
distribution problem. See FORD & BAUM, supra note 9, at 101-10 (comparing symmetric
cryptosystems and public key cryptosystems).
206. The official commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12, makes it clear that the
practice of accepting credit card information over the telephone is done entirely at the merchant's risk
in the event a cardholder later claims that a payment was unauthorized. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(2)(iii)
cmt. 1, at 351 (1997). Because the bank that issued the credit card has not provided the merchant a
means to identify the user under these circumstances, the issuer has not fulfilled one of the conditions
(that the card issuer has provided a means to identify the cardholder on the account or the authorized
user of the card), for imposing liability on the cardholder. Id. § 226.12(b)(2)(iii) cmt. 3, at351 (1997).
207. VeriSign Public CertificationServices: SubscriberAgreement (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.com/repository/SUBAGR.html>.
208. eriSign CertificationPracticeStatement (version 1.2, May 30, 1997)
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rights under the Netsure Protection Plan." 9 The rights of merchants who verify

consumer digital signatures by using the VeriSign Certificate Revocation List will
be governed by the VerSign Relying Party Agreement.21°
The VeriSign CPS defines the procedures Versign will follow before issuing
a Digital ID. Individual Digital IDs are currently offered in three classes.21' Class
1 Digital IDs "are issued to individuals only," and are issued after VeriSign
determines that there are no existing entries in VeriSign's database of subscribers
with the same name and e-mail address.2 12 The CPS notes that these certificates are
not suitable for commercial use where proof of identity is required. 3 Class 2
Digital IDs are "currently issued to individuals only" after VeriSign checks not only
its own database of subscribers, but also performs an automated check of the
applicant's information against"well-recognized consumer databases."214 The CPS
emphasizes that Class 2 certificates, "[A]lthough ... an advanced automated
method of authenticating a certificate applicant's signature," are issued without
requiring the applicant's personal appearance before a trusted party such as a
notary; therefore, relying parties should take this into account before accepting a
Class 2 certificate as identification of the subscriber.1 5 While VeriSign Digital IDs
issued under these circumstances may become popular when used in connection
with other existing consumer transaction systems such as credit cards, it is unclear
whether there will ever be a market where transactions are executed in reliance on
such a Digital ID alone.216

<http://www.verisign.comlrepository/CPS> [hereinafter CPS].
209. NetSure ProtectionPlan (version 1.0, June 20, 1997)
<http:llwww.verisign.com/repository/netsureindex.html>. According to the Netsure Frequently
Asked Questions page,
NetSure is an extended warranty Internet program which provides Digital IDsM
holders with protection against accidental occurrences such as loss of the
subscriber's private key (corresponding to the public key in the Digital ID) and
theft, corruption, impersonation, certain loss of use and unintentional disclosure
of a subscriber's private key to others, provided that you, a subscriber, have
fulfilled your obligations. Your obligations as stated in the CPS include taking
reasonableprecautionsto prevent loss or unauthorizeduse ofyourprivate key
and to use computer systems which are reasonably securefrom intrusion or
misuse.
'
NetSureW
ProtectionPlan: FrequentlyAsked Questions (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.comlrepository/netsure-faq/> (emphasis added). Given the lack of objective
standards as to what constitutes reasonable security for home personal computer use, it may be very
difficult for most consumers ever to establish a valid claim under this contract language. See supra,
text at notes 173-74, for a discussion of the divergence between the assumptions about consumer
computer security among the developer community and the reality of consumer computer security.
210. VeriSign Public CertificationServices: Relying PartyAgreement (visited Feb. 27, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.com/repository/rpa.html>.

211. CPS, supra note 208, § 2.2, at 7.
212. Id. § 2.2.1, at 7-8.
213. Id. § 2.2.1, at 8.

214. Id. § 2.2.2, at 8.
215. Id. at 9 (emphasis in the original).
216. For this reason, Stewart Bakerhas labeled them "cheap certificates." See Baker, supranote

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:739

Class 3 certificates may be issued to individuals or organizations.217 Class 3
certificates issued to individuals "provide important assurances of the identity of
individual subscribers by requiring their personal (physical) appearance before class
' For an organization, such
3 LRA or its delegate (such as a notary)."218
as a
corporation or government agency, to receive a Class 3 certificate, VeriSign's CPS
specifies that the organization's application process must "include[] review by the
applicable Class 3 IA of authorization records provided by the applicant or thirdparty business databases, and independent call-backs ("out-of-band"
communications)."2 9 Because Class 3 certificates require a personal appearance by
an individual applicant before a trusted third party, they are a much more reliable
means of identification than are either the Class 1 or Class 2 certificates.
While VeriSign Digital IDs are of limited use to merchants doing business over
the Internet in managing transaction risks, they represent a potential nightmare of
unlimited personal liability for consumers. Under the VeriSign CPS, a subscriber
who accepts a VeriSign Digital ID must represent, among other things, that "no
unauthorized person has ever had access to the subscriber's private key" at the time
of acceptance of the certificate and throughout the operational period of the
certificate." 0 In addition, "[b]y accepting a certificate, the subscriber assumes a duty
to retain control of the subscriber's private key, to use a trustworthy system, and to
take reasonable precautions to prevent its loss, disclosure, modification, or
unauthorized use."2' According to some consumer advocates, this trustworthy
system standard is a totally inappropriate method of evaluating security on home
personal computers used by consumers.222
Downloading and installing the most recent release of Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) results in the storage of the consumer's public and private keys on the hard
drive ofthe computer. That private key can be accessed by typing in a pass phrase.
Unauthorized third parties may gain access to this private key merely by accessing
the computer and guessing the pass phrase.2 Guessing the pass phrase can be
attempted most easily by copying relevant files from the consumer's hard drive to
another computer, and then taking as much time as is needed to determine the pass

189, at 2.
217. CPS, supranote 208, § 2.2.3, at 9.

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. CPS, supra note 208, § 7.2, at 53.
22 1. Id.§ 7.3, at 54. The CPS "trustworthy system" is defined as "Computer hardware, software,
and procedures that are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; provide a reasonably reliable
level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; are reasonably suited to performing their
intended functions; and enforce the applicable security policy. A trustworthy system is not necessarily
a 'trusted system' as recognized in classified government nomenclature." Id. § 13.1, at 98.
222. Cem Kaner, Speed Bump on the FraudSuperhighway: The Insecurity of the Digital
Signature,UCCBULLETnN (West Group), Jan. 1998, at2 [hereinafter Kaner, SpeedBump]; CemKaner
et al., SPLAT! Requirements Bugs on the Information Superhighway, SoFTwrav
QA MAG.
(forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Kaner, SPLAT.].
223. Kaner, Speed Bump, supra note 222, at 4.
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phrase by guesswork.' Individuals untrained in computer security are notoriously
bad at devising secure passwords, so in many cases the perpetrator easily discovers
the pass phrase.
Unauthorized third parties use several techniques to gain access to consumers'
home personal computers for long enough to copy the relevant files to another
computer. These techniques include copying the files while the computer is in the
shop for repairs, or while a repair technician works on the consumer's computer on
site. In addition, some software support programs copy large amounts of
information from the customer's system in order to analyze the problems the
customer is experiencing. The same software can be used to make unauthorized
copies of specific applications and data files without the consumer's knowledge or
consent. Therefore, the consumer maybe in the awkward position of having no idea
how a copy of his or her private key was obtained and, as a result, no way to prove
that he or she maintained a trustworthy system as required by the CPS.
As a risk allocation system, the VeriSign CPS is moving in the opposite
direction of most other electronic commerce systems, and resembles the system
establishedby credit card issuers prior to federal consumer regulations protection.22
No significant pooling of risks exists for consumer subscribers because, although
insurance is now offered, the insurance mimics the standard of care the subscriber
is required to maintain by the CPS and, thus, is unlikely to offer any relief to a
consumer who cannot prove how a copy of his or her private key was obtained. The
CPS allocates fraud or error losses to the consumer who is likely to be much less
sophisticated than VeriSign, and is completely incapable of deploying the kind of
technology used by credit card companies to reduce fraud.226 The problem of
information asymmetry is acute in consumer dealings with VeriSign because no
plain language disclosure of the risk allocation system exists outside the CPS,
which is over 100 pages of single spaced text written in dense legal prose.
The inappropriate allocation of risk implemented by the VeriSign CPS would
only be exacerbated in a jurisdiction with legislation modeled on the Digital
Signature Guidelines. Section 5.6(2) of the Guidelines provides that in disputes
involving digital signatures, there is a rebuttable presumption that the signature
belongs to the party identified in the certificate as the subscriber. 7 The comments
to section 5 .68 explain that this provision is modeled after the presumption that the
issuer's signature is genuine under negotiable instruments law. 9 Given the focus

224. Id.
225. See CLARK BARKLEY, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITs, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS

15.03 (rev. ed. 1995).
226. See supranotes 134-36 (discussing the use of holograms and neural networks as security
procedures). VeriSign would have difficulty taking advantage of the technology employed by credit
card companies today because VeriSign has not designed its system to permit the CA to monitor
individual transactions. Rather, the CA certifies the online identity of a party for a defined period of
time.
227. DIGITAL SIGNATuRE GtIDELINES, supra note 6, § 5.6(2), at 117.
228. Id. § 5.65 cmt.
229. See U.C.C. § 3-308 (1991 & Supp. 1997) (governing proof of signatures and providing that
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of the Guidelines'drafters on the technology of public key cryptography, it is not
surprising that a presumption of validity seemed appropriate. With regard to the
operation of public key cryptography, when one key ofakey pair is used to decrypt
a message, it is virtually irrebutable that the other key in the pair was used to
encrypt the message.
The problem with creating presumptions regarding the legal significance ofthe
use of public key cryptography is that no appreciable experience exists regarding
its use outside of military environments. It is not yet clear what type of security
procedures consumers can reasonably be expected to follow, but there seems to be
little congruence between what information security experts and developers of
digital signature applications seem to expect and the reality of personal computer
use by consumers." ° Without consumer protection legislation such as that used to
force credit card issuers to bear the majority of fraud costs, there will be little
pressure on developers to accept the additional costs of designing applications that
incorporate realistic accommodations for consumers.
In what is colloquially know as the "Grandma picks a bad password and loses
her house" scenario,"' a consumer who is not particularly sophisticated will install
an encryption program on her personal computer, choose a pass phrase that is easy
to guess, subscribe to a service such as the VeriSign Digital ID service, and lose
control of her key through some process she does not recognize or understand. The
party making unauthorized use of her key will purchase $1 million in software over
the Internet in a very short period of time in transactions that do not exceed the
reliance limit in the certificate. When Grandma tries to defend herself against the
claims of the merchants who have delivered software to someone claiming to be
Grandma, not only must Grandma establish that she maintained a trustworthy
system (ifshe is subject to the terms of the VeriSign CPS) in order to avoid liability,
she will have to rebut a presumption that the digital signature used in all the
unauthorized transactions is not, in fact, her signature.
Presumptions can simplify litigation by eliminating the requirement that a party
prove each element of his or her case in detail in situations where, as a matter of
fact or public policy, a connection between certain facts can be presumed to exist
without proof. In the context of negotiable instruments law, the presumptions
associated with the signatures of the parties began to take shape in the nineteenth

any party wishing to deny the validity of a signature must do so in his or her pleadings or will be
deemed to have admitted the validity of the signature, and that a signature will be presumed authentic
and authorized unless the purported signer is dead or incompetent at the time of the litigation).

230. Kaner, SPLA71, supra note 222.
231. The "Grandma picks a bad password" scenario has apparently passed into Internet
technology folklore. See Kaner, SPL42', supranote 222; Baker, supra note 189, at 2. The impact of
a "Grandma picks a bad password" case could be very substantial if Grandma tells her story on The
Oprah Winfrey Show and 20/20, thereby driving consumers away from Internet commerce in droves
and prompting state attorneys general to consider commencing class action law suits against CAs
issuing what Stewart Baker has labeled "cheap certificates." See supranote 216 and accompanying
text.
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century when the modem pleading rules replaced the writ system of pleading. 2 It
was not until UCC Article 3 was completed in 1957 that a formal system of
presumptions was established. Comment 1 to the 1957 version of section 3-307
explained that a presumption expressly provided by statute was new, although
similar provisions could be found in a number of states. 2 3 The Comment goes on
to explain that "[t]he presumption rests upon the fact that-in ordinary experience
forged or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon, and normally any evidence
is within the control of the defendant or more accessible to him."' The problem
with creating a similar presumption regarding the legal significance of an act that
is not yet taken in commercial settings is that there is not yet any "ordinary
experience" regarding how common unauthorized uses of digital signatures will,
in fact, be. Given that the VeriSign CPS holds consumers to a standard that seems
unrealistically high, it is plausible that the unauthorized use of digital signatures
may occur with some frequency.
While the VeriSign Digital ID is not yet in wide use in Internet consumer
transactions, a large volume of Internet consumer transactions take place through
the use of credit cards. The most successful consumer-oriented Internet commerce
site is run by Dell Computers and is reported to sell $3 million in personal computer
orders per day. 3 The Dell web site includes an explanation of the security used to
protect the confidentiality of the consumer's credit card number and gives the
consumer the option of telephoning in the order ifthe consumer feels uncomfortable
with the security procedures even after the explanation."s The Land's End web site
explains to consumers in plain language how the consumer's liability is limited,
how encryption is used within the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol to protect
such information during its transmission over the Internet, as well as telephone and
fax numbers for consumers who feel uncomfortable with Internet ordering.3 7 In
addition, the Lands' End site also explains Lands' End privacy policies and how
those policies can be evaluated in light of emerging industry standards regarding
consumer privacy rights."s
These successful sites have incorporated the credit card risk allocation model
into their business model for Internet commerce and are working to develop their
image as responsible purveyors of Internet commerce. Because the credit card
system operates as a complex system of trade association rules and bilateral
contracts, its use in Internet retail applications simplifies many of the problems
associated with designing a PKI capable of handling anonymous global Internet

232. Rogers, supranote 13, at 316-17.
233. U.C.C. § 3-307 cmt. 1 (1957).
234. Id.

235. See E-Commerce isBiggestBetweenBusinessSites, N.Y. PosT, Dec. 26,1997, at33 (noting
business-to-business sales records). The Dell web site is located at <http://www.dell.com>.
236. Store Security (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http:www.dell.com/store/into/safe.htm>.
237. Security on the Land's End Web Site (visited May 5, 1998)

<http://www.landsend.com/spawn.cgi?NODESECURITY0897&GRAPHIC&ZEROPAGE&08878
25296159>.
238. Id.
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commerce. The CA supporting the use of SSL to communicate credit card
information securely over the Internet is merely verifying the identity of the server
so that a secure communication channel can be set up; it is not verifying the identity
of the parties to the transaction in order to permit the parties to rely on digitally
signed messages as binding contracts. Many advocates of public key cryptography
assume that the primary application of this technology will be to bind the real world
identity of an individual to an online identity. The success of retail Internet
commerce web sites may question that assumption.
The volume of business-to-business Internet electronic commerce may soon
dwarf the volume of Internet retail transactions. The most successful business-tobusiness electronic commerce site is that of Cisco Systems, which one source has
reported as selling $3 billion a year ofrouters and other networking equipment over
its web site by late 19 9 7 .23' The Cisco model of business-to-business Internet
electronic commerce is a variation of the trading partner agreement model
develop ed for electronic datainterchange business-to-business electronic commerce
that gained popularity in the 1980s. 240 The contract between Cisco and the party
wishing to purchase Cisco products over the Internet is the Networked Commerce
Enrollment Agreement, which requires the customer to agree that he or she will be
bound by the actions of anyone gaining access to the Cisco web site and ordering
equipment through the use of the passwords issued the customer by Cisco.24' The
agreement also includes a list of authorized users and their passwords, which the
customer may revise at any time, and a list of the terms and conditions governing
the sale of goods and services.24 Cisco does not accept enrollment agreements
online. Instead, it requires customers seeking authorization to fax in a signed
agreement which it will review and return by fax before the customer may begin
placing orders online.
Cisco allocates the risk of loss of unauthorized use of passwords to the
customer after requiring the customer to sign a contract making the allocation of
risk explicit and requiring the customer to identify individuals authorized to trade
with Cisco and to assign those individuals passwords. 3 This risk allocation is
similar to that established in the Uniform Commercial Code in which the more
technologically sophisticated party, the bank, must agree to commercially
reasonable security procedure with its customer before the risk of loss due to
unauthorized funds transfers can be shifted to the customer. 2' Cisco's procedures
easily canbe integrated into its existingpurchasing procedures and are substantially

239. See E-Commerce is Biggest Between Business Sites, supra note 235, at 33.

240. For a discussion of EDI technology and the use of trading partner agreements, see
Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The CommercialUse ofElectronicDataInterchange-A
Report and Model TradingPartnerAgreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990).
241. Cisco Systems, Inc. Networked Commerce EnrollmentAgreement (last modified Sept. 12,
1997) <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/437/eca.html>.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-202(b), 203 cmt. 4 (1995).
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similar to procedures used to conduct more traditional EDI electronic contracting. 245
Because the Cisco System operates as a series of bilateral contracts and the security
it incorporates involves the use of passwords instead of public key cryptography,
it would not be accurate to describe Cisco as a CA or the system it has built for its
customers as a PKI. However, the success of the Cisco Internet electronic
commerce system testifies to the resilience and continued relevance of existing
models of electronic commerce in Internet environments.
Another business-to-business Internet commerce application that includes an
operational PKI using public key cryptography is that part of the Open Access
Same-time Information System (OASIS) which contracted with the Joint
Transmission Services InformationNetwork (JTSIN) Consortium for administrative
and security services.' The OASIS program was created in response to a mandate
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1996 to the electric
energy industry to make information about the availability of transmission capacity
accessible to customers over the Internet.247 A coalition of eight (out of twenty)
regional power pools formed the JTSIN Consortium to promote the use of
interoperable technology and standards while complying with the FERC mandate.'
The consortium contracted with several technology companies to design and
operate its member web sites.249 TradeWave, Inc. was selected to act as CA for the
pools participating in the consortiumY ° The relationship between TradeWave as
CA and the consortium members is similar to that of Cisco and its customers.
TradeWave executed contracts with each participating electric utility in which
TradeWave undertook to maintain a CRL. The actual issuance of certificates,
however, is delegated to "local registration agents" (LRAs) who are designated by
the electric utilities.2' TradeWave does not accept responsibility for the issuance
because it requires the consortium participants to
of unauthorized certificates
-2
LRAs2
designate
The risk allocation model implemented by OASIS is similar to the risk
allocation model in Article 4A of the U.C.C. The decision to delegate the oversight
of the certificate issuance process to the electric utilities was made by the JTSIN
consortium in light of which party was best able to prevent fraud or error. Before
any electric utility assumed its responsibility as a LRA, their obligations were made
clear in face-to-face negotiations with the representatives of TradeWave. 3 The
245. See generallyElectronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 240, at 1717 (model
providing guidelines for establishing commercial trading practices which implement electronic data
exchange).
246. For a more detailed explanation of the operation of the OASIS PKI, see Alexander J. Cavalli
&JaneK. Winn,InternetSecurity in theElectric UtilityIndustry, 39 Jurimetrics J. (forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript on file with author).
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OASIS PKI is now operational and has been successful in meeting the objectives
ofthe JTSIN consortium members.' The cost of providing CA services is kept low
because the most onerous responsibilities a CA might undertake have been
devolved to the LRAs. Moreover, the LRAs were able to make informed decisions
before accepting those responsibilities.
IV. IN WHAT WAYS ARE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES
SIMILAR'? IN WHAT WAYS ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

At the most general level, negotiable instruments and digital signatures are
similar in that they are both mechanisms for regulating the rights and obligations
of parties to commercial transactions that can only be given effect if the parties
comply with certain rigid formalities in their execution. Both mechanisms are
regulated by a decentralized risk allocation system that forces parties to take
responsibility for loss avoidance. This risk allocation is achieved both through a
combination of substantive and pleading rules that attempt to streamline the
enforcement of the rights of third parties against those releasing these devices into
the stream of commerce. Neither classical negotiable instruments law nor the ABA
Digital Signature Guidelines is sensitive to the inappropriateness of holding
consumers to the same standards as commercial entities.
Beyond these general observations, any appearance of similarity rapidly begins
to erode. At the most fundamental level, the classical doctrines of negotiable
instruments law reflects centuries of development of commercial practice and the
incremental development of commercial law through a colloquy between
merchants, courts, and legislatures. By contrast, public key cryptography is not yet
widely deployed in any business context. The debate over the proper regulation of
this technology is only beginning, and no consensus has yet emerged. However,
a group of advocates has been lobbying for certain statutory safe harbors to promote
the use of this technology. Such legislation is clearly premature, however, in light
of the uncertainty surrounding various competing models for implementing public
key cryptography.
Apparently, consumers were not well represented in the drafting of the Digital
Signature Guidelines. As a result, the Guidelines adopt a risk allocation model that
is directly contrary to those used in established electronic commerce systemsY 5 In
modem risk allocation systems, losses due to error or fraud associated with the use
of digital signature technology can be reduced by imposing losses on parties to the
extent that such loss imposition provides incentives to modify behavior. Losses that
cannot be avoided through the manipulation of loss imposition rules can be
distributed among system participants through risk pooling and insurance systems.
The Guidelines disregard these principles and allocate losses to subscribers and
relying parties, which may include consumers or other technologically
254. Id.
255. See generally Winn, supra note 5, at 33 (discussing the approaches of VeriSign and the

U.C.C.).
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unsophisticated parties. The Guidelines shield CAs, who have the best opportunity
to reduce losses through research and development and to pool risks through the
collection of insurance premiums in the form of user fees. The drafters of the
Guidelines focused a great deal of attention on what potential CAs might want in
the way of limitations of liability, but neglected to discuss what constitutes
appropriate levels of risk associated with consumer use of new technologies.
Rather, the complex issue of precisely what type of precautions consumers can be
expected to implement is subsumed by rules that require subscribers to maintain
trustworthy systems and to prevent the compromise of their private key. 6
The Digital Signature Guidelines were the product of thoughtful debates over
a period of several years by a group of technologists and attorneys committed to
encouraging the commercial exploitation of a specific technology. This is a very
different process than that which produced the modem law regulating widely used
negotiable instruments such as checks. 7 Negotiable instruments law developed
through precedent until its restatement in the British Bills of Exchange Act, drafted
in 1882. s In the United States, the first uniform law issued by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) was the
Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896, which was based in part on the British Act
and which was then soon adopted in all states except LouisianaY 9 U.C.C. Article
4 now governs checks as they are handled within the check collection system and
is based on the American Bankers Association Check Collection Code. 260 The ABA
Check Collection Code was completed in 1929 and adopted in 18 states by 1932,261
twenty-five years before its redaction into Article 4. The Check Collection Code
was based on the American Bankers Association standard form contract, which had
been in use since 1924.262 In 1989, Article 4A, governing the law of funds transfers,
was promulgated by NCCUSL. It applied to a funds transfer system that had been
operation since the 1970s.263 The much longer time periods over which these bodies
of law evolved reflect not only an accumulated understanding among the
participants of their legal rights and obligations, they also reflect the long
experience of the participants with the underlying commercial transactions. Because
commercial law is designed to enable private transactions rather than to impose
regulatory mandates, there must first be a commercial practice for these new laws
to be effective. No such commercial practice yet exists in the case of digital

256. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 6, §§ 4.1, 4.3, at 101, 103. The concept of a
trustworthy system was developed by the U.S. Department ofDefense in its Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). See supra text accompanying notes 119-25.
257. The accusation that Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. represent a sell out to special interests
is something that the Guidelines and the U.C.C. articles share. See Gilmore, Formalism,supra note
4, at 457 (commenting on the influences of the Negotiable Instruments Law of 1896 and the U.C.C.).
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259. BRAUCHER& RIEGERT, supra note 37, at 21.

260. See Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737,761-2 & n.80 (1978).
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signatures.
The Digital Signature Guidelines resemble one of the less successful
amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code, the 1978 revision of Article 8
governing investment securities." Article 8 was revised in the 1970s to take
account of the movement in the securities industry away from paper-based
processing toward computer processing for settlement and clearance of securities
trades.265 The 1978 amendments promoted the use of a specific technology-the
certificate-less securities system being devised by the U.S. Treasury for U.S.
government obligations. 266 The drafters of the 1978 revisions, like the drafters ofthe
Guidelines, assumed that some encouragement was necessary to prod the private
sector into following the lead of government in embracing a new technology.
However, what the drafters failed to observe was that the securities industry was
devising its own solution to the "back-office crunch" problem that was different
from the solution devised by the Treasury. 67 As a result, by the late 1980s, leaders
of the securities industry and their lenders asked the American Bar Association and
NCCUSL to revise Article 8 to bring it into line with existing commercial practice.
The language of the 1978 revisions bore no relationship to existing practices, and
the lack of certainty surrounding the legal effect of common industry practices was
feared likely to reduce the volume of credit lenders were willing to advance
securities firms. The 1994 revisions to Article 8 were based on a careful analysis
of current industry practices and include a novel approach to loss allocation that is
based on an analysis of those practices.
Most provisions of the U.C.C. can be thought of as reflecting the incremental
accumulation of business practice distilled into standard contract terms and further
defined through case law. While it was not true historically, there is no longer any
impediment to the use of general contract law by business parties to achieve the
functional equivalent of negotiability. 28 Likewise, there is no legal impediment to
a party wishing to offer commercial CA services within an Internet PKI to bind
both the subscriber and the relying party by contract to the limitations it wishes to
impose on its liability arising from transactions entered into in reliance on its
certificate. The impediment at this point is cost, and certain business models ofhow
to develop a market for CA services in the Internet marketplace will not be able
absorb the high cost of contracting with all the parties to transactions using digital
signature certificates. There is plenty of evidence that some parties are finding
viable business models for deploying public key cryptography in commercial

264. See U.C.C. Article 8, Prefatory Note (1995) (discussing the 1978 amendments); James
Steven Rogers, PolicyPerspectiveson Revised U.C.C.Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1431, 1441-49

(1996) (explaining the requirements of the new system).
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266. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability:A New Modelfor Transferand Pledge
of Interests in Securities Controlledby Intermediaries,12 CARDOZO L. RaV. 305, 311-12 (1990).
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environments, and until there is more evidence about which models will succeed
and which will fail, legislatures should not intervene to favor one commercial
venture over another.
Commercial law is best positioned to enable transactors to conduct their
business efficiently when the doctrines of commercial law resonate with the
common understanding of the parties. The common understanding of parties
conducting electronic commerce in large volumes today is not reflected in the ABA
Digital Signature Guidelines. The meteoric rise of the Internet from an obscure
network used by academics and technologists to a popular culture phenomenon in

only a matter of months indicates the fact that it is far from certain that Internet
electronic commerce will indeed build on existing models of commercial practice.
However, with each passing month there is more evidence that many of the first
commercial applications are simply not viable business models, and that
applications of Internet technology that build incrementally on existing experience
with electronic commerce may very well succeed.
V. CONCLUSION

The idea that certain doctrines of the law merchant, such as negotiability,
developed outside the common law and in sharp opposition to it was once a widely
accepted notion among academics and practicing attorneys interested in the
development of commercial law. This idea has been shown by recent scholarship
to be inaccurate. It seems based on little more than some spectacularly bad readings
of a few reported judicial opinions studied in isolation from their larger historical
context. Negotiable instruments law developed incrementally, through a dialogue
between courts, legislators, and the business community. The development of the
Digital Signature Guidelines resembles the mythic account of the development of
the doctrines of negotiability, however, more than it does the more accurate
revisionist account.
The Guidelines attempt to import wholesale into commercial law a normative
framework based on technical standards developed by engineers without reference
to most major existing electronic commerce applications. The assumption of the
Guidelines' drafters seems to have been that the future of open network electronic
commerce will be so different from existing closed network electronic commerce
that existing models would not be helpful for theirproject. Given the absence of any
established commercial practices corresponding to their model transaction, the
Guidelines adopt a regulatory rather than enabling posture. However, it remains to
be seen whether open network electronic commerce will in fact be so radically
different from closed network electronic commerce, and whether the Guidelines
will have the anticipated channeling effect on the development of electronic
commerce.
The risk allocation model suggested in the Digital Signature Guidelines draws
on the risk allocation model contained in classical negotiable instruments law. The
use of rules that resemble negotiability to make a new product more marketable in
commerce mirrors in many respects the spread of the doctrines of negotiability to
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encompass many new types of commercial transactions that were documented by
Professor Gilmore in 1954.269 The analogy quickly breaks down, however, because
the spread of negotiability noted by Professor Gilmore reflected commercial
practices and was not imposed on the parties by regulators outside the business
community.
If parties to a commercial transaction are able to adopt risk avoidance or risk
pooling strategies, then the parties may find that loss allocation rules such as
negotiability suit their needs well. However, under modem conditions of
communication and information processing efficiency, the parties have alternatives
to predictable but harsh systems of loss allocation like negotiability. In any modem
system of commercial transactions, risk management systems involving centralized
risk pooling and insurance should be considered before a system that imposes losses
on consumers who will not be able to predict or control the risk.
Dwight Arthur, a professional technologist who has closely followed the
debates about how best to develop PKIs that can support the commercial
exploitation of the Internet, suggested an analogy for understanding why it might
be premature to develop detailed regulations governing the commercial use of
public key cryptography. He suggested that the commercial use of the global
information infrastructure is now at an equivalent level of development to that of
the fiational transportation infrastructure of the United States in the late nineteenth
century. The internal combustion engine had been invented, and the use of asphalt
for paving roads had been developed. The current effort to regulate how PKIs will
ultimately be used on the Internet makes as much sense as trying to draw up
regulations governing the interstate expressway system in light of the knowledge
ofthe properties of internal combustion engines and tarmac.27 The impulse behind
the Digital Signature Guidelines is laudable, but the analogy to well established
commercial practices and commercial law doctrines that regulate them is poorly
taken. Before a commercial law of Internet commerce can develop, a record of
successful commercial practices must first be established.
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